groups in sixty countries, it has no power. Governments can and do ignore its queries and its appeals. Its principal weapon is its ability to publicize the offenders, their actions and, all too often, their refusal even to acknowledge the existence of either their questioners or their victims.

There is just one niggling question. Amnesty International has of course every right to oppose vociferously the death penalty under all circumstances. But such an attitude can occasionally muddy the waters. It somehow seems inappropriate to use the same cool tone to describe the legal execution of convicted murderers as one does to detail the wholesale murder and torture of dissidents.

In the whole context, however, the reservation is a minor one. If Amnesty International did not exist, we would have to invent it, for it serves as the conscience of the world.

Tom Sloan is an Ottawa journalist and writer.

Help for the White Paper

by Peter Ward

lе

s.

n-

re

lat

ns

ite

ler

ns

ent

of

try

for

sts

m-

'he

en-

a

ess

ınd

ted

not

hat

ife

of

sts]

ng

est

ith

ica

rity

ali-

is

has

Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective by David Cox. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1986, 51 pages, free.

High Tech and the High Seas edited by Brian MacDonald. Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985, 176 pages, \$14.00.

Strategy and the High Arctic edited by R.B. Byers and Michael Slack. Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, 117 pages.

Three recent publications bear strongly on the White Paper on defence, released this past spring by Defence Minister Perrin Beatty. Most of what this collection of academic papers and discussion transcripts have to say confirms the urgent need for the up-dating of Canadian defence policy contained in the White Paper. The authors would applaud the goals Mr. Beatty has set. There is, however, substantial argument over the way he has set Canada's defence spending priorities.

An overview of Canada's defenceof-the-nation problems comes from the first of the three publications, Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective. Author David Cox was then the Institute's research director, and is a member of the Queen's University Department of Political Studies. His 50-page paper contains some excellent tables comparing NATO-Warsaw Pact weaponry, including the range of everything from ICBMs, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs), and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs).

Professor Cox makes the argument that if the US proceeds with the Strategic Defence Initiative, then Canada will be involved inevitably. We have agreed to participate with Washington in the up-dating of North American detection of manned aircraft and cruise missiles — the North Warning System and if the US implements SDI against ballistic missiles, defence against those weapons will certainly be integrated with defence against bombers or submarines carrying long range cruise missiles. Cox suggests that Canada should insist that new radars for the North Warning System be located on the fringes of Canada's Arctic islands, rather than on the northern mainland, as were the DEW line sites. He points to Canada's deplorable lack of ability to monitor air traffic in most of her air space, and he suggests that Canada put up her own radar satellites, for defence detection purposes, and also for peace time air space control. His arguments are well made.

He is on less firm ground when he suggests that the nuclear submarines Mr. Beatty wants to buy would be used solely for the Arctic, under polar ice. Nuclear submarines are the best of all anti-nuclear submarine weapons, too, and anti-submarine warfare is Canada's prime NATO maritime task. The fact they will also be the best detection/protection system for under the ice is a bonus.

Professor Cox's paper is must reading for those who attempt a serious analysis of the White Paper.

The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies' paper titled *High Tech and the High Seas* is a transcript of the Institute's proceedings of Spring 1985. Despite the age of the paper, what went on two years ago in Halifax bears directly on the White Paper, because Mr. Beatty's key policy decision is an expensive revitalization of the Canadian navy.

The Halifax conference began with an overview of Soviet and NATO maritime strategy, and the implications for an alliance of Atlantic nations now that the Soviet Union has a worldwide blue water navy. At one point during discussion, the then Maritime Commander, now retired Vice Admiral Andrew Fulton, erupted in frustration over how the political dictates of a "buy Canadian" policy were forcing the Canadian navy into second rate computer equipment purchases.

Admiral Fulton presented a paper of his own, listing for the audience the composition of what he would consider to be the ideal mix of maritime strength for Canada. The White Paper's plans fall short of the admiral's wish list, but there are some striking parallels. His ideal fleet would include four nuclear submarines, four diesel-electric submarines and three helicopter carriers, as well as twenty-four frigates, four helicopter-carrying destroyers, twelve minesweepers, eight patrol boats, and four polar icebreakers in naval service. There would be four naval bases — not two - in Fulton's ideal Canadian navy, and a mix of thirty long range patrol aircraft, with sixty-four sophisticated anti-submarine helicopters.

Of the eleven papers presented for discussion at Halifax, one of the most alarming was that of Commander Fraser McKee, now President of the Navy League of Canada. He has almost made a career out of warning Canadians of the danger of mines in our ports if a crisis should arise. His description of the mine high technology now available, and the ease with which an enemy could block Canadian harbors, casts a chilling light on our vulnerability. When the White Paper was released this past spring, McKee was guardedly optimistic about the importance Defence Minister Beatty attached to taking action on the danger of mines. He has no intention of abandoning his crusade until the minesweepers promised in the White Paper are in service.