

*Minorca*, and another sufficient sent into the *Bay* before the fleet for *Canada* would have sailed. But how amazing is it, that notwithstanding this situation of affairs, instead of yet sending any succours or protection to *Minorca*, they, on the 8th of *March*, send two ships of the line and three frigates off *Cape Barsleur*, to intercept a coasting convoy only; on the 11th of *March*, two of the line to the *West Indies*, and on the 19th two of the line to *North America*, where they were insufficient either to protect or acquire any material object : On the 23d of *March* two of the line and three frigates off *Cherburgh* to intercept the above coasting convoy also, and on the first of *April* five of the line (three of which returned from watching the coasting convoy) under *Holbourne* to reinforce *Hawke* in the *Bay*, when he was already much too strong for the fleet bound to *Canada*, some of them being only *armes en flute*, and not expected out till *May*. All of which ships might have been added to Mr. *Byng*'s squadron without endangering *Great Britain*, according to the government's own apprehensions of an invasion at that time; for if these ships could be spared abroad for the above services, they certainly might for *Minorca*: and then Mr. *Byng*'s squadron would have been 20 of the line and six frigates. But instead of adding the above ships to Mr. *Byng*'s squadron they sent him with only ten of the line, and even denied him a frigate that he petitioned for to repeat his signals, (see his *Letter to the Admiralty*)

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