security in an age of super-powers to our great neighbour. But let that fact not be forgotten. I speak of "security" not in the sense that there would be anywhere to hide in the event of a nuclear war but in the sense that the long-term prospects for a stable peace rest on the continued ability of the West to resist military pressure.

We have not worked our way out of the cold war, just as we did not survive the bitter confrontation of Stalin's day, by giving way to such pressure. And the West's ability to resist it is basically the ability of the United States. Having that power of resistance confers the freedom to seek constructive solutions: it has not been used by the West to exert such pressure in its turn. In Hungary in 1956, in Berlin in 1961, in Cuba in 1962, a response in kind to extreme provocation would at the least have paralysed the process of internal evolution in the Communist world for years, even if it had not led to the ultimate disaster.

It is this engagement of the Soviet Union with the United States which enhances our role in East-West relations. Clearly, close relations with the United States, symbolized in the security field by our active co-operation in NATO and NORAD, are essential if our views are to be taken into account in Washington -- which they are. Similarly, on the Soviet side we are of interest less for what we are, a nation of 20 million people, than as a neighbour of the United States, sensitive to the movement of American public opinion and disposing of some influence in Washington.

Those who argue that Canada would be able to play a more effective role internationally if we withdrew from NATO fail to meet two arguments. They cannot demonstrate that we should gain new influence. We could not hope to lead the non-aligned states, whose principal concerns are different from our own. And we should lose the close association with the United States and the other major members of NATO which is the source of much of our influence in the world, an influence which is greater than our population and economic power would alone support.

Our alliance confers on us both influence and the freedom to use it constructively. What are we to do with it? What we are doing is this — we are addressing ourselves to the central problems of disarmament, and specifically at present nuclear proliferation, in preparation for the time when genuine progress can be made. We are equally working on more immediate issues such as the war in Vietnam which stands almost impenetrably across the road to profitable resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue.

For reasons of its own, the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to work openly for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, but neither has it cut its lines to the West as a whole because of it. Indeed, the Soviet Union has specifically declared that the war in Vietnam should not be allowed to obstruct the disarmament negotiations at Geneva.

Nevertheless, the manner in which the Vietnam war is ended will do much to shape the form of East-West relations in the future. Meanwhile, as long as no Soviet-American dialogue on the war and its attendant problems is taking place, Canada, with contacts in Washington and Moscow, Saigon and Hanoi, has both the responsibility and the opportunity to help span the gap.