

It is sobering to remember that to date all of the nuclear-tipped missiles that have been destroyed, and all of nuclear warheads that have been dismantled, have been as a result of arms control diplomacy not through military force or defensive systems.<sup>61</sup> Unfortunately, this is a stark reality that has escaped the proponents of missile defences—even though the vast bulk of these destruction/dismantlement measures were agreed to under Republican administrations in the US. And it clearly indicates the importance of not turning away from the first line of defence—arms control—in favour of a last line of defence, military preparations.

The US is currently engaged in a nuclear posture review but it is not at all clear if it will address the relevant questions,<sup>62</sup> such as: is the US prepared to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states? Does the US require new lower yield “bunker-busting” nuclear weapons to deal with regional threats? What is the US nuclear doctrine? What is the relationship of nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control? How much deterrence is needed? Is it still in the US national interest, and in the interest of strategic stability, to maintain a robust and balanced triad of strategic offensive forces? What is the purpose of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence? How will the US manage a transition to deployed missile defences without provoking instability? And, how is the US fulfilling its nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT?

The 1994 NPR was a wasted opportunity, will history repeat itself in 2001? Thus far, the odds militate against major change. The planning principles devised by STRATCOM act as powerful road blocks to deep cuts in nuclear forces: as the number of warheads is reduced, the triad becomes more important because of the increased vulnerability of fewer platforms to attack or failure; as the target base is reduced due to reductions in strategic forces, the flexibility and capability of the triad increases; as the number of warheads is reduced, transparency of the remaining numbers and types becomes more important; as strategic offensive warheads are reduced, the value of non-strategic warheads increases; as the overall numbers and types of nuclear warheads are cut, the value of the remaining ones increases; and as the number of warheads is reduced, the impact of missile defences on both offensive and defensive nuclear war planning becomes more important.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> The 1987 US-USSR INF Treaty resulted in the elimination by May 1991 of 846 longer-and shorter-range US INF missile systems and 1846 Soviet INF missile systems, including the modernized U.S. Pershing II and Soviet SS-20 missiles; and under the INF and START I agreements the US has dismantled some 13,000 nuclear warheads and Russia more than 6,000.

<sup>62</sup> See, Janne E. Nolan, “Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,” *Arms Control Today* (November 2000); and Robert Kerrey and William D. Hartung, “Toward a New Nuclear Posture: Challenges for the Bush Administration,” *Arms Control Today* (April 2001).

<sup>63</sup> Derived from, Hans Kristensen, *The Matrix of Deterrence*, (May 2001).