

President Truman and Prime Minister King which ensured that continental air defence issues would be dealt with jointly in order to counter the intercontinental delivery of weapons by Soviet bombers. This was accompanied by a number of arrangements for joint Canada/US naval monitoring exercises in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans aimed at countering possible Soviet intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missile threats, as well as by agreement to cooperate on intelligence matters. In addition, by 1958, the US cemented the bilateral security relationship by establishing the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). This Command was established by a simple exchange of notes between Canada and the US. The establishment of NORAD combined with the mid-Canada radar line, the CADIN-PINETREE line, the Arctic Distance Early Warning (DEW) radar line, and the Defence Development/Production Sharing Arrangements, all signalled an increasingly integrated and cooperative approach to air defence on the North American continent -- what might be labelled as a "latent war community" or a "security community."<sup>20</sup> It should be noted, however, that while Canada is considered an equal partner in this relationship, the US pays 90% of the bill.

As Canada became increasingly roped into a North American defence/security community, it became clear that the country had also bought into the US perception of the threat to North America as well as supported the US's position on how best to deter that threat. Some have argued that this compliance posture on the part of the Canadians showed the extent to which Canada had become simply a "powder monkey".<sup>21</sup> However, one can make the case that this bilateral security arrangement was made possible because Canadian liberalism was highly compatible with the broad internationalism that informed US foreign policy during the Cold War. In other words, the Canadian government chose to get itself entangled in this arrangement for largely ideological and practical reasons.

With the end of the Cold War, one has to question Canada's continued commitment to NORAD. A parliamentary review in the late 1980s concluded that Norad's missile/attack assessment, space surveillance and air sovereignty functions were still necessary for Canadian defence, because thousands of nuclear warheads from some of the states that were formerly part of the USSR are still pointed at North America. However, this defence against help argument is rapidly losing its salience as the air threat to North America is diminishing. The set of assumptions that prevailed during the Cold War tended to obscure for Canadian foreign and defence policymakers any possibilities for change. But unlike their American counterparts, Canadian policymakers placed much more hope in multilateral instruments as potential avenues for initiating changes in international relations and for securing the Canadian state.

### Canada and the United Nations

Canada developed what may be called a diversified strategy for addressing his security concerns. As noted above, the Canadian government rationalized the strategic threat to Canada as coming from the global threat of communism and the threat of nuclear war. The government dealt with these perceived threats by becoming part of a regional/transregional alliance and by developing a secure bilateral relationship with the US. As part of its diversification strategy, Canada also chose to become involved in a number of multilateral arrangements, the most important of which was with the United Nations system.

Canada helped to form the United Nations in 1945. Indeed it was a major player in the