

Appendix B Suggestions for Future Research

Sidney N. Graybeal and George Lindsey

The following suggestions, presented here in the form of a few questions that attempt to sketch the topic, are not necessarily in order of priority. They represent potential areas for future research.

- In the new international security environment, what criteria should be used for evaluating arms control agreements and the arms control process?
- How applicable is the criterion of "military significance" to multilateral and regional non-proliferation agreements? What other criteria might be considered?
- What steps can or should be taken after non-compliance with arms control agreements, confidence-building measures or peace operations? Should potential actions, for example, economic sanctions or military actions, be sketched out and agreed to in advance of non-compliance?
- What criteria should be used to judge the effectiveness of a verification regime for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
- What criteria should be used to determine what constitutes destabilizing levels of conventional weapons in various regional contexts?
- What technologies can and should be shared in co-operative monitoring of multilateral and regional arms control, non-proliferation and transparency agreements?
- What verification measures could be utilized to assure that *dual-use* technologies and processes are not applied to military purposes?
- With the wide-scale proliferation and deployment of land mines, what multilateral agreements or measures could be implemented to remove or minimize their destructive effect?
- What are the pros and cons associated with attempting to control military budgets? Could such controls be effectively monitored?
- What are the requirements for a UN information/intelligence centre? What are the practicalities associated with achieving such a centre? How would it operate? What criteria should be used to judge its effectiveness?

