

Looking to Western Europe, the picture is also on the whole a reassuring one from the security viewpoint. West Germany, the principal European danger to Russia, has undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons in the non-proliferation pact and the Soviet-German treaty of August 1970. The latter measure, combined with the Polish-German pact, the four-power agreement on Berlin, and the arrangements between the two Germanies have removed a variety of territorial and political threats to the WTO powers and reduced the danger of a military confrontation in Europe. The EEC seems unlikely to achieve the degree of unification necessary to pose the threat of either a European nuclear force or an adjunct Franco-British capability. The NATO-WTO military balance clearly favours the USSR, and NATO is itself increasingly divided. On the other hand, the American attempt to shift more of the burden of defense to its allies, the qualitative improvements being made in NATO conventional forces, British attempts to obtain the Poseidon missile from the United States, and the NATO move toward early reliance on tactical nuclear weapons,<sup>83</sup> all presumably give concern. These problems and the long term issue of permanent German demilitarization and containment, can best be approached by encouraging a continued American military presence in Western Europe through MBFR, and by enlarging the scope of East-West détente and agreements as means of reducing West German and European tendencies toward a greater military