

In 1984 agreement was reached that the destruction of existing stocks should be subject to systematic international inspection, but there was disagreement over the particular inspection procedures to be used. There were also significant differences regarding the right to demand and refuse on-site inspections, the need to declare the location of production facilities, and the requirements of non-intrusive but effective means to control the remaining chemical industrial base. The United States tabled a "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" in April 1984, but there was little progress in overcoming the disagreements between the two sides.

Current Canadian Position

In the Ad Hoc Committee, Canada has stressed the need for a comprehensive but politically acceptable regime of verification. In 1985 Ambassador J. Alan Beesley reiterated the need for procedural reform throughout the CD. He criticized the frequently repetitious deliberations and urged the recognition and expansion of common ground, with less emphasis on divergences. He called for less criticism and more positive proposals from all delegations.

Beesley expressed Canadian interest in both non-proliferation and verification in his April 1985 address to the CD, which stressed the importance of achieving a verifiable ban on chemical weapons. He noted that Canada, in agreement with many other countries, had imposed controls on the export of certain chemicals that could be used in the production of extremely toxic weaponry. However, the closing-off of production routes for these weapons required a comprehensive treaty to make the action really effective.³

³ Conference on Disarmament, Chemical Weapons-Final Records (PV) 1985 Session, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, February, 1986, CD/PV 306, 4 April 1985.