

However, the growing number of departments and agencies concerned with "foreign affairs" and the variety and scope of Canadian interests and activities has placed an increasing burden on the existing structures in Ottawa, as indeed on the foreign offices in other developed countries. In the United States, for example, the point of intercept has tended to shift between the Department of State and the White House (or National Security Council) Staff, and sometimes it has tended to move toward the Department of Defence and the Office of International Security Affairs.

Since policy formulation and analysis can be usefully examined only in relation to the mechanism for reaching and implementing policy decisions, we have touched in this chapter on organizational or structural problems. Further discussion of these problems is contained in the following chapter. For the remainder of the present discussion, we shall be concerned with the substantive role of the diplomat in the complex and rapidly developing situation of which an outline has now begun to appear.

Underlying the thesis that the diplomat should in future be a "technomat" is the assumption that it is possible to pursue policies central to Canadian interests (e.g. aid, cultural, economic, technological) while giving only minimal attention to general political matters. The assumption appears to gather strength from the currently popular assertion that foreign interests and objectives are an extension of domestic ones: which, however, underestimates the cybernetic or feedback effect of our foreign activities, the multitude of ways in which actions initiated outside Canada can affect us and the generally dynamic character of the international environment. There is scarcely any major development abroad which may not affect life at home at some stage and in some way in most countries, and which does not therefore require us to respond in some way.