

Later still, in 1980, the Americans attempted to block OAS assistance to Grenada in the aftermath of serious flooding. They also prevented the extension of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) relief funds, disbursed through the Caribbean Development Bank, to Grenada. These clear demonstrations on the part of the Carter Administration of its disapproval of the new regime deepened Grenadian concerns over American intentions, while arousing further innate Grenadian hostility towards the United States. That the Grenadians were disappointed and offended by these American actions was evident in later comments of Maurice Bishop:

The truth is that from the earliest days of the revolution, we had problems with the Americans . . . In the first weeks of the revolution, in return for a promise of \$5,000 aid, their Ambassador Ortiz tried to dictate to us what our policies must be and in particular was bold enough to warn us against developing "close ties" with Cuba. Naturally, we gave him the answer that we were not for sale and that our internal and international policies were entirely a sovereign matter for us, not subject to any outside negotiation or dictation . . . The Americans also refused to accredit our permanent representative to the OAS as ambassador to Washington.⁸¹

Grenadian attitudes towards the United States hardened further in 1979-80 as a result of an attempted coup and repeated bombings and shooting incidents apparently aimed at destabilizing the regime. These were attributed by the Grenadian regime to exiles grouped around ex-prime minister Gairy, operating from bases in the United States with the support of the CIA.⁸²

Although the degree of US involvement during the Carter Administration in this campaign of destabilization is unclear, it appears that the US Government made little effort to terminate such activities on its soil. Moreover, the refusal of the United States to

⁸¹ "We'll Always Choose to Stand Up", in *op cit.* (note 73), p. 49. See also Bishop's comments on US denial of disaster assistance and attempts to block multilateral assistance in *ibid.*, p. 50.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 49.