



tween exaggerated expectations and gloomy foreboding do not facilitate the necessarily careful and painstaking way in which difficult policy choices must be tackled.

As both the Prime Minister and I have made clear, the USA and USSR have made remarkable progress on the central arms control and disarmament issues over the past months. They are still seriously engaged in the task of seeking compromise on remaining areas of disagreement.

We are encouraged by the public undertakings of both the President and the General Secretary to build on the progress which was achieved at Reykjavik. The resumption last Wednesday in Geneva of the nuclear and space negotiations can only be regarded as more good news.

The superpowers have succeeded in bringing a major arms control agreement tantalizingly close.

We can't stop here. We must move ahead. Arms control is a fragile process. Its environment must be protected. It is therefore doubly important that all actions be resisted which might be seen as weakening or unravelling the existing international framework on which East-West relations and arms control are built.

Much attention has been focused on SDI and the ABM treaty. The Geneva negotiations will need to resolve the differences that continue to exist here. Progress in other areas should not be held hostage to the resolution of these difficulties. Our European allies are especially concerned with intermediate nuclear forces. Canada would like to see an agreement in this area as well as in the area of strategic weapons, which threaten us directly.

Canada believes firmly in the value of the confidential negotiating forum. It is, in the end, irreplaceable. But it can be aided through techniques such as special envoys and, as we have just seen, by summits. We would urge both superpowers to continue to use all these techniques, and not rely on negotiating in public.

If a summit in Washington this fall is now unlikely, setting a date for early next year could help maintain the impetus of the process.

Canada is involved in East-West relations as a member of the NATO Alliance. That Alliance is the foundation of our security. What happens at the negotiating table between the USSR and the USA has a direct bearing on our own security. We are at the same time a nation dedicated to peace. Canadians have always worked for peace and international understanding. We have not, and will not, hesitate to make our views known: publicly when that is appropriate, privately on a permanent basis.

But Canada's role is not simply to give advice. Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues in particular attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence. Such an approach enhances the credibility of our counsel.

Canada's participation as a Western country in the process of building East-West relations will continue. The visits to Canada in the last month of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister were part of this process. And early next month I will travel to Vienna for the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting which deals with East-West relations from the human rights, security, economic and human contact dimensions. It provides us with another opportunity to move the process ahead in an integrated comprehensive manner.

Our hopes for real progress in East-West relations were strengthened by the developments at Reykjavik. Canada has been in touch with both sides, before and since the meeting in Iceland. We will continue to use all our resources to help the United States and the Soviet Union build on what they began."

Canada Views USA Decision on SALT II with Serious Concern

On November 28, the Department of External Affairs issued the following statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

"The United States took action today that places the number of US strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in excess of a specific limit of the SALT II agreement. President Reagan had announced last May that the USA would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II agreement and would no longer, as it proceeded with its modernization programme, dismantle older systems to stay within SALT II limits.

The Government viewed with serious concern the Administration's announced intention in the spring and deplores the implementation of that decision today. Our views have repeatedly been conveyed to the US Administration. We have most recently made our case in a letter from the Prime Minister to the President this week, and in my discussions with Secretary of State George Shultz last week. The Government recognizes that SALT II is not a perfect agreement and acknowledges that the USSR has not satisfactorily responded to charges of its own non-compliance with provisions of SALT II. At the same time, we believe that even an imperfect regime of restraint on the strategic arms race is better than no restraint at all. We have taken note of stated US intentions to exercise restraint and not to exceed the levels of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. I call on both sides to exercise restraint.

Our hope remains that the USA and USSR will agree, in the Geneva negotiations, on a new arms control accord that will radically reduce, and not merely put a cap on, the level of their strategic arsenals. Until such an accord is attained, however, we consider the interests of nuclear arms control and strategic stability are best served by both the USA and USSR continuing to abide by the provisions of the SALT II agreement."