

defence arrangements. These arrangements had been made largely piecemeal to take care of immediate military problems. The question now at issue was whether they could be adapted to peacetime conditions.

From a strictly military standpoint it might be argued that there was now no need for Canada to underwrite the security of Newfoundland which, with the United States in strategic control of the Western Atlantic, was probably as secure as it had been while the Royal Navy was in control. The three American bases were still active and, although the United States had made no commitments for local defence except for its base areas, it could be counted on in an emergency to come to the assistance of Newfoundland in its own interests. But there were other than military considerations. Canada's assumption of responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland had been clearly recognized by Britain and the United States in the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of 1941. To repudiate this obligation, or to permit local defence to go by default, would indirectly encourage the United States to take over local defence in the event of an emergency, a situation which might be unacceptable to the people of Newfoundland or to the people of Canada. More generally, while not anxious to assume costly post-war defence commitments outside Canada, the Canadian Government had learned during the war that Newfoundland was indeed essential to the defence of Canada.

One difficulty was the uncertain political future of Newfoundland. Its people had been promised that they would decide their own political future if the Island once again became solvent, a condition which was at least temporarily achieved in the latter years of the war due mainly to the massive construction programmes of the United States and Canada. Any Canadian post-war defence arrangements, to be lasting, would have to be adaptable to various political alternatives. Meantime the Newfoundland Government was reluctant to assume responsibility for decisions which might be unacceptable to the Newfoundland electorate in the event of restoration of responsible government. If Newfoundland were to join Canada, the situation would be automatically solved, as defence would be a federal responsibility. But at the time union seemed very unlikely.

#### *Tenure to Defence Installations*

From a legal standpoint Canada's post-war defence position in Newfoundland was much weaker than that of the United States. The United States presence rested on the leased bases agreement of 1941, which defined the rights, powers and privileges of the United States forces in Newfoundland in peace and war. These included the right to operate virtually anywhere in or over Newfoundland in war or emergency. On the other hand, while Canada had enjoyed wide freedom of movement in and over Newfoundland during the war, and the use of whatever facilities for defence were available, its position depended basically on the goodwill of the Newfoundland Government and on government regulations implementing wartime statutes such as the *Visiting Forces (Commonwealth) Act* and the *Emergency Powers (Defence)*