

the best of our knowledge, all atomic weapons are kept in the United States or in U.S. ships, but this would undoubtedly delay the Strategic Air Force in getting a major attack under way.

(b) The introduction of atomic weapons into the air defence system, both in ground-to-air and air-to-air roles.

2. If nothing more is involved than SAC deployments, the matter could be handled along the lines of the procedures agreed upon in 1951 for over-flights, i.e. by official government-to-government requests for permission to make such deployments.<sup>15</sup> If the use of atomic weapons in an air defence role is what the Americans have in mind, however, the problem is more difficult, and our position on the following questions would have to be considered:

- (a) areas of Canada over which the weapons might be fired;
- (b) operational control of weapons fired in the United States but functioning over Canada;
- (c) availability of weapons for Canadian air defence forces;
- (d) availability of full information on numbers, characteristics and effects of the weapons.

3. I think that the fact that this problem is coming up at this time is additional evidence of the importance of our getting on with the study of national security policy,<sup>16</sup> and in particular of our position with respect to North American air defence.

J. L[ÉGER]

15.

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*Note du chef de la 1<sup>ère</sup> Direction de liaison avec la Défense  
pour le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division,  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TOP SECRET. NO CIRCULATION.

[Ottawa], January 18, 1956

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OVER CANADA

General Foulkes stated in his letter of January 11 that the approach which the United States authorities are expected to make in late February or early March regarding the "use of atomic weapons over Canada" may be related to the use of air-to-air missiles in Canadian airspace and perhaps to the future delivery of intercontinental ballistic missiles through Canadian airspace.

2. These are not matters which come within the scope of existing agreements or understandings, except possibly the general agreement (embodied in the [35]th recommendation of the P.J.B.D.) for "reciprocal provision by mutual arrangement between the Governments of its military, naval and air facilities by each country to the armed forces of the other country", and the accompanying proviso that "military projects, tests or exercises, agreed to by both countries, whether jointly conducted or not, are without prejudice to the sovereignty of either country, confer no permanent rights or status upon either country, and give

<sup>15</sup> Voir/See Volume 17, Document 699.

<sup>16</sup> Voir volume 21, chapitre VIII, note éditoriale, p. 1640.

See Volume 21, Chapter VIII, Note by the Editor, pp. 1640-1641.