

*National Defence Act Amendment*

when some political objective might be considered somewhere in the world as of sufficient importance to use force of arms. This is clearly what is going on in the world today. Our problem in Canada was to devise and develop a defence policy sufficiently broad and with sufficient flexibility that our forces could contribute to the deterrence of a major war at one end of the scale and through to these peace keeping activities at the other end of the scale or assist in putting out a small conflagration before it escalated into all-out thermonuclear war.

This is not easy because it requires a wide range of equipment and a wide range of training. At the same time, it is possible and we are achieving it. We are achieving it with considerable success and intend to continue to achieve it in the years ahead. Our troops in Europe are committed at the high end of the scale. They are there as a contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and as a part of the integrated force in peacetime. Militarily, they are very effective. Politically, they are very important. It is an indication on the part of our country that we stand with our allies to deter aggression on the part of any possible enemy.

At the same time there have been demands on our forces to contribute to peace keeping and other activities. There is a real possibility that this will continue in the years ahead. It is difficult to determine in advance precisely what the requirement will be. We have participated in every United Nations operations so far, but there have been no two that have been the same. Each one has been different. The problem then was to devise a policy and to design a forces structure sufficiently flexible to enable us to continue to do what we have been doing, make our contribution to the NATO forces in Europe and on the high seas and increase the capability of our forces to participate in any action anywhere in the world which might be in the interests of Canada in so far as putting out, containing or controlling incidents which under other circumstances might escalate into something more serious.

• (4:40 p.m.)

This was the basis, then, of the policy as laid out in the white paper. There were two significant changes, I think, that really should be mentioned. They are associated with the two words, flexibility and mobility. First of all we reversed the policy of 1959, that the Canadian army in so far as new equipment was concerned would only be equipped to

training scale for the three quarters of the army in Canada and to full equipment for the brigade group overseas. I know that my hon. friend from Calgary North has questioned this, but I have the policy before me. It was established in 1959. The formal decision was taken and it applied to over-all equipment purchases. Therefore the policy then in effect, which meant that only one quarter of the Canadian army would be equipped and available to fight overseas, was reversed.

The second most significant change was the decision to increase strategic mobility, in other words, to provide more aeroplanes and ships to transport our troops more quickly to meet any commitment either in Europe or any other part of the world. These were the two fundamentals from the policy side.

If I may, I should like to discuss now the organization side, the means by which this increased capability could be achieved. At the time I was given the responsibility as Minister of National Defence two impressions were made on my mind during the early months. One of them was that the six methods of direct reporting to the minister were too many and that there was insufficient co-ordination of plans. The three chiefs of staff, the chairman of the chiefs of staff, the chairman of the Defence Research Board and the deputy minister all had direct access. Programs could be brought to the minister directly by any of the chiefs of staff, and they often were. In a number of cases there was not the kind of co-ordination that is necessary in my opinion to get the most cohesive military force and the best balance between the forces of our country.

There was no over-all strategic plan applied to the three services. Each service was planning independently of the other services. There was no over-all co-ordination of the equipment programs in the sense that priorities were established on a hard basis to fulfil national objectives. Often programs were put forward by a single service directly to the minister, and often these were approved. These required such a proportion of the total funds available that subsequent programs needed to fit a higher policy could not be brought into the over-all financial picture.

It seemed necessary, therefore, that two changes had to be accomplished. One was an over-all strategic unity in planning, a unity of purpose with the services working together for clearly understood goals. Second, once having decided what these plans were and