

this revision is of no benefit. You will have no saving of time or expense; in fact, you will have all the trouble and expense of the enumeration to reach the same conclusion to which you can attain to-day under the law as it is.

Mr. MEIGHEN: the point is just this, that the work is 90 or 95 per cent done instead of the judge having to do it afterwards. If the right hon. gentleman's reasoning was correct, we might as well never have a list and simply have a challenge on election day. That would mean that the judges of Canada would have to revise 1,750,000 votes, whereas by having lists made up by the enumerators as carefully as their abilities can do it, you reduce to a mere fraction of one per cent the work that a judge would have to do.

Mr. A. K. MACLEAN: What section are we at?

Mr. MEIGHEN: Paragraph (h), section 42, at the bottom of page 3.

Mr. A. K. MACLEAN: I did not understand that the former clause was passed.

Mr. MEIGHEN: We are not passing anything; we are passing from one to another.

Mr. GRAHAM: They are touching them all.

Mr. OLIVER: In regard to the procedure in Alberta, at one time the procedure embodied in this measure was partially followed in that province. The provision was made that the man whose name was not on the list could swear his vote on, and that vote was subject to subsequent adjudication before a court.

Mr. MEIGHEN: That is in the provincial election only.

Mr. OLIVER: Yes. It was found in practice, if my memory is correct, that this resulted in other than the public interest, and instead of making the vote, after being cast, subject to adjudication, as to its being counted, it was considered to be sufficient that the man who attempted to vote should take an oath thereby rendering himself personally liable to a penalty if he had exercised the right improperly. Experience showed, in the judgment of the authorities there, that it was not in the public interest that the validity of the vote itself should be the subject of judicial investigation. It was considered that the penalty for taking a false oath was a sufficient restraint to answer the requirements of the public, although theoretically, of course, it was not an altogether equitable, final decision. This

Bill goes further and provides for the tying up of votes of men whose names are put on the list by the enumerator.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN: Would my hon. friend suggest that we had better have the proposed judicial revision eliminated from this Bill and make it precisely as it is now in Saskatchewan and Alberta?

Mr. OLIVER: I do not wish to take the responsibility of introducing the legislation that my hon. friend sees fit to introduce.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN: My hon. friend is trying to give suggestions.

Mr. OLIVER: The Secretary of State has laid emphasis on the statement that he is following the conditions in Alberta and Saskatchewan.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN: But providing safeguards.

Mr. OLIVER: I am pointing out that, if I understand the matter correctly, he is following conditions as they have been, but abandoned in Saskatchewan and Alberta for reasons that prevail there but that may not be valid in other parts of the country. I am only desirous that there shall not be a misunderstanding on the part of the committee as to the facts of the case, and that the committee may not be impressed with the idea that the provisions of the Bill are desirable in application throughout Canada because it has been found necessary, owing to special circumstances, to apply them as they are applied in Alberta and Saskatchewan. What did occur in Alberta when the principle that is contained in this Bill was embodied in the provincial law was this: Ballots were tied up vexatiously, for the purpose of improperly influencing the election in this way: A number of votes would be challenged, and they would be tied up. They would not be counted at the general count. Then there would have to be a semi-judicial investigation as to the validity of those votes, and there is always the possibility of manipulating the evidence that might be brought to bear, and if the first count seemed to be to some extent indecisive, then the election had to be fought all over again in the courts in regard to those tied ballots. It was not because the principle was not theoretically sound. The principle was, theoretically, absolutely sound, but in practice it did not work out properly, and, if I understand the matter correctly, the authorities decided rather to take the chances on the occasional count of a vote that was not valid than to prejudice