

Finally, there is the ever-present option of financial assistance, ranging from World Bank and IMF loans through direct infusions of cash to forgiveness of debt. This option has the benefit of keeping the First-World states at arms' length from regional problems, but also has the considerable disadvantage of eliminating the ability of donor states to control how money is spent. In the absence of some resolution of regional tensions, any money thrown at the problem risks feeding regional militarization and nuclear proliferation.

In addition to these internal incentives, there are a number of external ones available for exploitation which may enable the developed nations to bring non- or counter-proliferation pressure to bear on India. The foremost of these is the reduction of tensions and eventual normalization of relations between Beijing and New Delhi. This is far easier said than done, particularly in view of Chinese activities in Tibet and Myanmar, and the resultant refugee crises created in India. It would require resolution of outstanding border disputes between the two countries, and some form of realistic and verifiable non-aggression pact. While there are some of what might be called tactical CSBMs in place on the Assam-China border designed to control border incidents, these are very limited. More strategic CSBMs, such as surveillance overflights, challenge inspections, exchanges, and the like, have proven more difficult to establish. For these reasons, near-term normalization of relations and the development of meaningful CSBMs between New Delhi and Beijing are not promising options.¹⁸

A more hopeful possibility would be securing agreement from Beijing to suspend weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology assistance to Pakistan, and to observe the strictures of the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR. Chinese assistance is the largest single affront to Indian nuclear sensitivities and, given the existence of advanced indigenous missile and nuclear weapons programmes in Pakistan, is probably no longer vital to Pakistan's ability to maintain a minimum deterrent posture. Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation is a thorn in the side of relations between the world's two most populous states, and must be resolved before significant progress may be made in reducing regional tensions.

Finally, rhetoric issuing from New Delhi ever since the 1974 PNE has consistently offered complete nuclear disarmament in conjunction with the "Big Five" offering to do the same. That this has major propaganda elements is suggested by the fact that India has continued to expand its nuclear programme despite significant cuts to strategic forces by the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France. India will not significantly reduce or eliminate its arsenal so long as the P-5, and China in particular, fail to do the same. To date India has quite consistently offered full denuclearization if the rest of the world's powers do the same. In making this offer, the Indians have rarely had to consider seriously the possibility of making good on this offer, since the rest of the world will, of course, not be doing the same. But if this situation were to change India's position on this matter would have to do so as well. Accordingly, pursuit by the developed world of

¹⁸ For a more in-depth discussion of the Sino-Indian security calculus, see Therese Delpech, "Nuclear weapons and the 'New World Order': Early Warning from Asia?", *Survival* (Winter 1998-99), pp. 57-76.