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October 11, 1967 The three wars as succession of the court simply the the court of the

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Control Countrillor, will see it the past continue to to the settlement of other vital issues that concern TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM

In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 27, Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam would be "the key to a solution, the starting-point in the process of solving the Vietnam problem". Mr. Martin reiterated suggestions he had made to Parliament in April showing how a start might be made "on the road away from war by a progressive return to the ceasefire arrangement worked out at Geneva in 1954".

Mr. Martin's remarks on the war in Vietnam

follow:

...It would be encouraging and, indeed, deeply gratifying to all of us at this Assembly if we were able to note that the thunder clouds of war had lifted from Vietnam since one year ago, when we gathered in this same forum to review the problems of the world. That is not the case. The suffering and destruction in Vietnam continue unabated. Despite all the efforts, including those of my own country, to seek a basis for negotiation the issues behind the conflict seem to remain as intractable as ever.

Once again we face the question, therefore, whether this organization can help to bring the Vietnam conflict closer to a peaceful and mutually acceptable conclusion and to foster political stability and economic progress in an area of the world where

both are so badly needed.

There are, of course, reasons which militate against immediate and formal action being taken by this organization at this time. We cannot escape the obvious fact - and it is a fact that I regret - that some of those most directly concerned with this Conflict are not represented in the United Nations. I

do not wish to suggest that, if it were otherwise, we should automatically find ourselves closer to a concrete solution to the problem in Vietnam. Whether this situation will change in the future I cannot say, but I do not believe that efforts for peace need be held in abevance until it does.

A second important reason for the inability of this organization to contribute constructively to a solution in Vietnam is that the great powers are divided on the causes of the conflict and on the measures required to terminate it. As we all know, the Security Council can function effectively only if its members will unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, as the Charter indeed calls upon them to do. And I can see no immediate prospect of that unity being found.

And so to be realistic in assessing our present ability here to act collectively and as an organization must not be regarded as a justification for apathy and inertia by each of us individually. This, I think, has been the conviction of the Secretary-General, who has made repeated efforts to find a solution, as have others. This has also been the conviction of Canada. We must strive to bring into play whatever channels and whatever forms of peaceseeking machinery may be available to the international community. Our goal must be the restoration of peace, and making it secure, at the earliest possible time. That surely was the overriding concern which gave birth to this organization; and I am one of the very few in this hall who attended that birth.

As members of the United Nations, partaking as we do of common objectives and obligations. I think we must register our concern in terms clear enough