Condamnés à agir

several hypothetical examples of how competition policy regimes (with no treatybased disciplines to sustain them) could be distorted if captured by import protectionists facing tighter rules governing the use of antidumping. This argues for developing, over time, a number of binding international guidelines to ensure that such a hi-jacking does not occur further down the road. With a view to encouraging further research, the Paper also presents a tentative list of such binding criteria that could guide the enforcement of competition policy within the free trade area in a manner that respects the complex nature of competitive markets, while reducing the uncertainties in that policy of which some recent critics have complained.

The Paper concludes with a brief discussion on the gradually changing dynamic in the U.S. that could increase the prospects for antidumping reform over time: the gradually growing dependence of the U.S. market on international trade and the increasing concern in that country with the proliferation of active antidumping regimes abroad and how these are beginning to threaten U.S. exports and U.S. jobs. The Paper suggests that these changes provide some basis for careful coalition building with U.S. exporters, the users of imported inputs and consumer groups with a view to launching an incremental antidumping reform process.