

have synergies with those countries' NIM and with the NTM/MTM/ITM of other interested countries. Southeast Asia would also constitute an excellent region to utilize Open Skies as a confidence-building measures. Assistance in development of inspection regimes to verify regional agreements might be offered by interested countries, similar to the many in which the U.S. government worked closely with the government in Seoul to help the Republic of Korea conclude an inspection regime to verify its bilateral agreement with North Korea when it enters into force. Although India might refuse to sign the NPT in this period, the inspections associated with the NPT would yield certain synergies in respect to Pakistan. Indeed, such a standstill agreement might bring India to the point of agreement to join the NPT.

Nuclear rollback in the Middle East focuses on Israel. Capping its nuclear weapons capabilities might cause other countries in the region to defer the acquisition of such weapons. Israel's concerns about its security would be enhanced by the verified adherence to the CWC by its neighbors. This may require a strengthened CWC verification regime, as discussed below. In addition, potential nuclear proliferators in the region would need to be denied the technology, equipment, and material needed to build reprocessing or enrichment plants. This denial would need to be backed up by strengthened export controls and by the synergies associated with combining targeted aerial and on-the-ground surveillance.

A number of actions should be taken in order to enhance the verification synergies associated with a CWC. A sophisticated international data base management system should be developed that not only collects information, but identifies those pieces of information which signal the need for additional verification activities. The development, testing, and evaluation of signature exploitation systems suitable for on-site inspection verification purposes will assist in the resolution of technical issues concerning sampling during the conduct of challenge

inspections. Evaluation of the effectiveness of various types of sensors, intrusion and/or tamper detectors, inventory control devices, closed circuit television, and other pertinent equipment will enhance site monitoring by the International Inspectorate.

Recent efforts made by verification experts from Canada, the United States, and a number of other countries to begin identifying measures that could determine whether a signatory to the BTWC is in compliance with its obligations should be continued. The experts are compiling lists of potential measures in three areas: development; acquisition or production; and stockpiling or retention.

Under its Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiatives (EPCI), the United States has expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological or missile programs. The Australia Group has followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The EPCI could well serve as a model for countries who are not members of the Australia Group.

For those parties who believe that a rigorous CWC verification is required, the current regime could be strengthened considerably by the addition of aerial monitoring using several sensor technologies including multi-spectral imagery. Air sampling of production facilities could also be incorporated into the verification regime, along with sampling of water, foliage, and earth at or near production facilities.

Non-proliferation treaties must provide for challenge inspections of suspected activities on a timely basis, while still meeting concerns about frivolous challenges, security risks, and economic espionage. A more effective verification regime might include the following three elements: a right of any state party to challenge

