

1) U.N. Continuing Conference on World Security

A U.N. Continuing Conference on World Security is a proposal to set in motion an international negotiating process on security on the model of the Law of the Sea Conference. Such a conference could provide the forum for negotiating many of the points raised in this paper. This conference would "multilateralize" security negotiations, a useful initiative since in the nuclear age all nations face a common threat and, as we have noted, have a legitimate interest in common security.

The object of such a conference would be to allow states to define the requirements of their security, and to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral treaty for the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Borrowing from the successful model of the Law of the Sea negotiations, the continuing conference would discuss the subject of security across a broad spectrum of issue areas, thus allowing for a complex give-and-take between all parties in the various areas. This would ensure that most states would see possibilities for a net gain through the process.

Such a conference would aim at strengthening international law and institutions in four areas: border and territorial disputes, external interference in the internal affairs of states, disarmament and enforcement of international law.

Recommendation 3-3: That Canada sponsor a proposal for a U.N. Continuing Conference on World Security which would continue meeting until a treaty establishing improved legal and institutional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes is achieved.

2) International Satellite Monitoring Agency

An ability to gather reliable information is the essential first requisite in the evolution of the U.N. into an organization capable of providing for international security and for the verification and "effective international control" of disarmament as envisioned in the Final Document of the First U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Logically, any state sincere about disarmament, and a signatory in good faith of the Final Document, must be looking for opportunities to build up the competence of the U.N. in preparation for the larger responsibilities envisioned for the U.N. in the Final Document.

There are many proposals in circulation for developing a U.N. monitoring and verification capability. The most prominent and promising one is the proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. World federalists regard ISMA as one of the single most important initiatives Canada could undertake in support of a strengthened U.N.

ISMA's value should not be judged primarily in terms of its usefulness in monitoring superpower arms agreements. Its value lies in its ability to provide a neutral source of intelligence information:

- to the Secretary-General to enable the U.N. to anticipate conflict and take preventive measures,
- to the U.N.'s own peace-keeping troops to improve their effectiveness,
- through the U.N. to states fearing an attack, thus reducing superpower opportunities in third party conflicts.