

constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). A certain number of individuals (such as Sihanouk and Son Sann) would be able to take part in these elections provided they had disassociated themselves from Pol Pot, but only the Communist Party would participate as a party;

- There would be no further use of Thai territory and with this in mind an international conference on Southeast Asia would be held in Canberra;
- There would be an end to any meddling in the conflict by countries outside the region (including China and the United States);
- The international community would guarantee this settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.⁹²

In mid-June the Vietnamese Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterated these demands with the same intransigence in an interview with the newspaper *Quan Dhoi Nhan Dan*.⁹³ In the meantime, ASEAN had, in April, put forward the idea of "proximity talks"⁹⁴ which had the attraction of involving direct negotiations between Cambodians of different factions and ideological tendencies. This idea of holding talks between the Cambodians themselves was not new. It had already been proposed by Prince Sihanouk at the beginning of 1984 when he suggested holding a meeting with the leaders of the PRK, and in September President Heng Samrin had responded positively to the idea of meeting Sihanouk in Paris. At the time, however, pressure on the part of the Chinese and the hostility of the two "allies" of the CGDK had prevented this project from being carried out and once again Prince Sihanouk had threatened to resign.⁹⁵

⁹² Karl D. Jackson, "Indochina, 1982-1985: Peace Yields To War," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka (eds.), *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security*, Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Pub. Company, 1986, page 198.

⁹³ *SWB*, FE/7984/A3/3, 22 June 1985.

⁹⁴ See the previous chapter.

⁹⁵ Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia: Sihanouk Stonewalled," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 1985, page 4.