

deployment (allowing development and testing) of all long-range cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometres. In essence, the Soviets were proposing an extension of the limits on GLCMs and SLCMs established in the SALT II Protocol and applying those limits to ALCMs.

It was not until July 1983 that an adjusted US position was presented in the form of a draft treaty. The draft repeated the US call for a ceiling of 5,000 on ballistic missile warheads with a 1,250 ceiling on launchers (up from 850). In deference to the Soviets, ALCMs were pulled back from phase II but only limited indirectly. Bombers were to be limited to 400 and were allowed no more than 20 ALCMs each.

No limits on GLCMs or SLCMs were proposed. The US felt that since GLCMs were being dealt with at the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotiations they should not be addressed in START. According to Strobe Talbott there was some consideration within the Reagan administration of using the US lead in long-range SLCMs to get Soviet agreement to a complete ban. But, in a pattern similar to that of the ALCM, the missile was now seen to have real military value and therefore to be too valuable to trade away.³

The Soviets eased their cruise missile position slightly during 1983. They proposed that bombers with ALCMs be counted as MIRVed missiles as they had been in SALT and continued to call for a complete ban on GLCMs and SLCMs with ranges above 600 kilometres. In December 1983 the Soviets refused to set a date for the resumption of negotiations as a protest against US deployments of GLCMs and Pershing II missiles in Europe.

New Structures

The START negotiations established the Reagan administration's approach to reductions. The US proposal created a separate category for bombers and cruise missiles rather than including them in an aggregate limit of ballistic missiles and bombers with cruise missiles as had been done at SALT. The proposed result would see both sides with equal numbers of ballistic missile warheads and equal numbers of bombers, creating a situation in which the structure of both nuclear triads were proportioned in the same manner.

However, the Soviet nuclear triad has traditionally emphasized ballistic missiles, especially land-based missiles (ICBMs). These currently account for 61 percent of their total warheads (see Table 1) while the Soviet bomber force has contributed only six percent on average to the total strategic arsenal. If the Soviet Union accepted the US framework they would be in a position where they maintained equal numbers of ballistic missile warheads with the US but had only one-quarter of the 400 bombers suggested in the US proposal. If, hypothetically, the Soviets were to consider such a framework they would be faced with two options: either build up their bomber

(and ALCM) force to meet the upper limit; or accept a bomber force, and total strategic force, clearly smaller than that of the United States.

The Soviet START proposal for extending the SALT framework at lower levels reflected their desire to maintain the principle of freedom to mix bombers and ballistic missiles under aggregate ceilings as established at SALT. In this case they would share an equal aggregate ceiling with the US without having to change the specific structure of their own triad. Their use of the phrase *nuclear charges* during the negotiations also signalled their desire to give a sense of equivalence to ballistic missile warheads and cruise missile warheads, as well as gravity bombs and SRAMs.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Negotiations began again under a new mandate in March 1985. The new talks were divided into three categories: intermediate-range missiles; strategic nuclear arms; and defence and space arms. The initial US proposal on strategic nuclear arms was virtually unchanged from the final US position at START, as was the Soviet response.

In September 1985 the Soviet Union put forward a completely new proposal calling for 50 percent cuts in strategic arms. The proposal signalled Soviet willingness to move towards deeper reductions, bringing them much closer to levels proposed by the US. On cruise missiles, the Soviets retreated to their early START and SALT position of calling for a ban on all long-range cruise missiles including ALCMs.

The US responded in October with a new proposal of its own. Among other things the US proposed a limit of 350 on heavy bombers of which 120 could carry cruise missiles. In a new twist they also proposed an upper limit of 1,500 ALCMs. The new proposal offered more substantial limits on ALCMs than the US had been willing to consider at START.

Six months later, in June 1986, another new Soviet proposal was put on the table. Compared to previous negotiations the Soviets came to an early acceptance of ALCMs and moved away from a complete ban on cruise missiles. Their proposed ceiling of 8000 nuclear charges included both ALCMs and SLCMs deployed on surface ships.

By this time the Soviets had begun deploying their own long-range ALCM. By deploying the missile on new versions of the older *Bear* bomber, the Soviets were able to deploy their ALCM four years ahead of US estimates which had assumed they would wait for the new Soviet bomber, the *Blackjack*. US Central Intelligence Agency estimates in June 1985 projected deployments of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet cruise missiles (in all three variants) over the next ten years.

The US response in August 1986 brought the US overall numbers even closer to those of the Soviet Union