

Hill: Will there, in fifteen years, still be anything that can be called a threat – the sort of thing that was in the White Paper? Will there be any niche for Canada in Europe in fifteen years time?

Cox: Let's imagine a Europe in which we have a somewhat backward Soviet Union, and this burgeoning unified Germany – but in the context of the European community – with the United States and Canada, mainly the United States, as a declining external guarantor: is that a bad recipe for a security arrangement? Why do we have to worry so much about the Soviet Union in terms of its economic development? The Soviets know that they are behind. They know that they have no real near, or medium term, prospect of catching up. They are in a position which is somewhat worse than the Brits'. The British haven't gone berserk except on occasion. They have adjusted to the fact that they are now more like the Third World than like continental Europe. Couldn't the Soviets do the same? Are we looking at a terrible set of ingredients for stability in Europe?

Hill: Denis, you spoke about the European colossus that may be emerging – what would Canada's relationship be?

Stairs: We are all speculating like mad, and when you speculate you retreat to your first education; it is what you read when you were twenty-one and twenty-two that counts. If you look at this problem of the relationship between an emerging Germany and the Soviet Union, the logic, of course, is not that the two would ever go to war. The logic is a concert system. And the historic model is the Nazi-Soviet pact, it is not the model of nuclear stand-offs. I would see a return to fairly classical forms of interstate politics.

This reflects on our dilemma, because in my view, all of this hasn't changed Canada's position a bit. As we all know, Canadian defence policy mostly has been to support Canadian diplomacy in the post-war period. If we are really honest, and leaving aside the special problems of surveillance of North American air space and those things, the reality is that we have not been in any sense a decisive player in preserving the security of the West. So Canadian defence expenditures have been about buying access to multilateral institutions at which we like to express ourselves, hopefully to prevent other countries from making fools of themselves – on the assumption, of course, that we never make a fool of ourself.

What you do is you find out what institution is coming out of the woodwork and you promote it as best you can. Then you go around and you ask everybody else in the institution what they would like Canada to do and then you argue about the price and get in as cheaply

as you can. I know that sounds flip but that is essentially what the Canadian security problem has been and still is.

Thériault: That's very interesting, but I agree. That certainly has been the thrust of our foreign-defence policy for the last twenty years. But I also think that there has been a very substantial measure of self delusion in that policy. I have never been a strong subscriber, really, to the Pearson Building influence-school of international relations. To me influence is something that evolves from the ability to affect events and to move



*We do none of the
elementary things that
you want to do in your
society if you are going to
sustain a serious strategy
of multilateralism.*

things, and eventually, the cheque at the end of the equation is power – and we have not had the power.

Certainly we have been welcome in one measure or another in the various councils as a result of this structural arrangement. From my own personal experience, having participated in a number of these fora, I have had a very strong sense that it is a long time since we have really had any credibility or influence of any kind. And if anyone has had illusions about it, it has been we Canadians, no one else.

Stein: I disagree with traditional Canadian modesty and pessimism. If we look at Europe, ten years from now, fifteen years from now, there are two alternative institutional scenarios that I can see, and very concrete issues that

arise. Canada is clearly going to have to make a decision about which of these it prefers. One is the politicized NATO, which includes the united Germany, but that is all, largely, and one is an entirely different set of security structures, which may come from the CSCE institutional format. But the essential difference is that it will be a set of security structures which plans for broad security, and will include Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union. I would suspect that the US will very much prefer the first: a politicized NATO with the united Germany in it; close the door.

Where do we position ourselves in formulating a policy on what is a pretty fundamental issue? Do we see ourselves as constrained by the US on these kinds of issues, as we have in the past?

Morton: Whatever I might prefer, I don't see the slightest evidence that we are more independent today than we were ten or fifteen years ago, or, under present management prospects, that we shall be so in five, ten or fifteen years – barring catastrophe too unpleasant to think of. That is not said in any desire to either appear modest or to be modest, that is our set of priorities. Canadians will tell their government that after some posturing and arm waving, economic fundamentals come first. And we've thrown our lot in with the US economically, we always have pretty much, diplomatically and politically. I think Americans – present management and predictable management – would prefer the NATO arrangement, and would expect Canada to be ready, aye, ready. I mean, tell me why they wouldn't?

Hill: If we were all devising White Papers, what would you like to see in terms of Canadian policies for the next ten or fifteen years?

Cox: I think one should be trying, in fact, to identify the political context in which this will take place. In my mind no matter whether one thinks we spent too much or too little, on defence, in the next few years we are going to spend less. I am not in favour of getting out of NATO, certainly not now. But the price of staying in for the kinds of things that Janice is talking about, probably could be much less.

Stairs: I have some real concerns about what is going to happen to ocean resources on both coasts, and I think we need a certain kind of surveillance capability there – I don't think we have enough now. I can give you chapter and verse because I live in Halifax. These are the real security issues if you look at it in traditional state protection terms. After that you are really getting into the dues payment game.