## Immediate Canadian Policy

## A. General Line

The general line of policy which emerges from the foregoing analysis is as follows:

- 1. Of overriding importance is the Canadian Government's maintaining a clear independence of U.S. policy, so increasing Canadian influence and enabling it to be used consistently for the lessening of East-West tensions and for the promotion of multilateral disarmament.
- 2. Further, since the lessening of tensions and the prospects of disarmament are helped by the very existence of the non-aligned nations, and would be further helped by a strengthening of those nations, that Canadian aid to underdeveloped countries should be significantly increased.

## B. NATO Policy

- 1. As to Canada's position with respect to NATO, the most convincing step Canada could take to demonstrate its independence of U.S. foreign policy and so to play the part it should play in world affairs, would be to withdraw from NATO, since NATO is bound to remain a military alliance dominated by U.S. foreign policy (unless, indeed, the policy of France destroys U.S. domination of NATO, in which case the military usefulness of NATO would also be destroyed).
- 2. Since the Canadian Government, and the opposition parties are not yet ready for withdrawal from NATO, we must consider whether any policy short of withdrawal from NATO is both feasible and useful.

The minimum policy consistent with the aim of strengthening Canada's possible contribution to world disarmament and reduction of world tensions seems to me to be as follows:

(a) The Canadian Government should be urged to decide, and immediately announce its decision, to negotiate a non-nuclear role for Canada in NATO.

This would reduce, as far as it can be reduced, the damage already done by the government's having signed the nuclear agreements to which Mr. Pearson alleged Canada was committed by the previous government.

(b) The Canadian Government should be urged to decide, and immediately to communicate its decision (in the first instance through diplomatic channels) to the other Western and the non-aligned nations, that it will remain in NA10 only if the U.S. takes some new clear initiatives in breaking the disarmament negotiations deadlock. The initiatives might be those proposed by Osgood. (Charles E. Osgood: An Alternative to War or Surrender; Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962, 183 pp., \$1.45) or Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni: The Hard Way to Peace, A New Strategy; Collier Books, 1962, 285 pp., \$1.10).