

Influence of Russia's Collapse Upon France as a Great Power.

AT last, the serious press of Europe—in estimating the influence of Russia's collapse upon France. The latter, believed by some German organs to be writhing secretly in the toils of the Dual Alliance, is put, cartoon fashion in the position of a fascinating female who has united herself with a bear for the sake of his worldly position, only to find, when complications come, that the bear's liabilities exceed his assets. The bear, it is evident from what the *"Vossische Zeitung"* (Berlin) says, is without that acute sensitiveness to his own shortcomings which is so apt to characterize in similar circumstances "the hero of a novel written by an unmarried young lady. Our Berlin contemporary predicts that all the money of foolish France will be borrowed and spent, and that she will be left in the lurch at last:

"The war in the Far East has hitherto taken a course which can be anything but desirable to the French. It is not only that their ally is fundamentally shaken. From the point of view of their own interests her ally is lost to them. The relationship subsisting between the republic and the czarism shows itself more and more in the guise of a leonine pact. All the advantage is on the side of Russia. France has only the burdens and the perils. Why did France strive for such long years to attain an alliance with Russia? Why did she rejoice when for the first time the word 'alliance' was spoken? Why did she have medals struck and distribute swords of honor when this brotherhood in arms was formed. Certainly not for the sake of leave to leap to the side of 'the great Czar' in the far East in the event of his not having Japan alone to fight against. Rather was it hoped to win the help of Rus-

sia in the task of winning back Alsace and Lorraine. The autocrat of all the Russias was to lend the weight of his mighty arm as a means of realizing the longings of the French for revenge. One must be a good neighbor to the neighbor of one's neighbor, according to an old axiom of diplomacy. For that reason much was hoped from the war with two fronts that was yet to be forced upon the Germans, even though the precise date of that war remained uncertain.

"The calculation was foolish for no Czar allows the Cossacks to march anywhere but in the direction of his own interests. But there was great readiness on the Seine to seize the opportunity to miscalculate on this point. It may, likewise, have been supposed that sooner or later some circumstances would arise to make the Czar regard it as his own interest to degrade the German Emperor and King of Prussia once more to the level of Margrave of Brandenburg. All these calculations are done with for some time to come. For by this war in the Far East Russia is being weakened to such an extent, and by its prolongation she is so compromised in the military, economic and financial sense, as to be in no position to undertake a war in Europe, more particularly against a power of the first rank like Germany. . . .

"Hence the alliance with the Czarism has lost for the French, whether they admit it or not, all practical value. They can expect no further benefit from this combination. All the greater is the benefit to Russia. If the British are hindered from coming to the aid of Japan, in the event of severe defeat being inflicted upon her, it will be only on account of the danger lest the French make common cause with the Russians. Upon this the French