

*Legitimacy  
recognized  
but violence  
deplored*

had these three features. The Canadian Government condemns *apartheid* and colonial rule and has expressed the judgment, in a Government White Paper, that these white regimes will struggle to the bitter end to preserve their privileges. Secondly, despite a belated Canadian recognition of the legitimacy of the liberation struggle, Canada has continued to deplore the use of violence by Africans as they seek to gain their rights. Thirdly, Canada has continued to seek to benefit from the better-than-average trade and investment opportunities that white oppression has made possible in southern Africa.

In the context of white-dominated southern Africa, to deplore violence is to suggest that Africans should not resort to armed struggle in a situation where alternative means to remove grave injustices have failed and are no longer open to them. It is, in fact, to recommend surrender.

The profound ambivalence in the official Canadian position is revealed in Canada's handling of the question of aid to the liberation movements. The Canadian Government has always refused such assistance. However, it finally supported a Commonwealth conference decision last year that member countries should help those struggling for their freedom in southern Africa. The aid program it then proposed — but which has not yet been implemented — reveals what we critics regard as a minimal compliance with that commitment to the Commonwealth.

In five important ways, the policy that Mr. Sharp announced differed very significantly from parallel policies of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, to which it bore similarities. First, the Canadian Government will not deal directly with the African leaders of the liberation movements. In contrast to this, senior officials and ministers of each of these five countries have recently visited Africa for detailed discussions with leaders of liberation movements to sort out with them how to provide the most effective forms of non-military aid.

Secondly, these countries provide this aid directly to the liberation movements. In contrast, Canadian aid will be provided to Canadian voluntary agencies that have acceptable humanitarian projects in southern Africa. The centrality of the liberation movements is thus blurred by the Canadian program while it is recognized by the programs of these other nations.

Thirdly, Canada alone has stipulated the rigid condition that its aid cannot involve the transfer of money to the liberation movements.

Fourthly, Canadian aid will reach

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southern Africa only to the extent that voluntary agencies are able to produce projects and, presumably, can provide the matching grants that CIDA's program of non-governmental aid requires. This means, therefore, that a technique that elsewhere in the world provides marginal supplementary aid to direct Canadian aid is, in the case of southern Africa, to be relied upon entirely for all the aid Canada plans to offer outside of its multilateral programs.

Finally, these restrictions are bound to keep the total sums involved very low. Swedish aid to the liberation movements is to a total of \$10.7 million next year; Finnish aid will be approximately \$2.5 million; Dutch aid is to total \$4 million. The only indication I have seen of the sums that are likely to be involved in the Canadian program is Mr. Gerin-Lajoie's recent comment: "You can bet it will not be in the millions." It is a safe bet he recommends.

Since the announcement of this timid aid program, the Portuguese revolution has occurred and the liberation movements are in process of coming to power in Mozambique and Angola. In 1969, Nyerere asked, "if Canada cannot support our struggle, will it at least be able to refrain from giving comfort and help to those who deny freedom and dignity to us?" So far as the Mozambique and Angola struggles were concerned, to their very conclusion the Canadian answer to Nyerere's plea had been negative. Canada continued to be a major importer of Angolan coffee and oil even though these purchases were directly aiding the Portuguese war effort. Canada never used the forum of NATO to press Portugal to end its colonial rule in Africa. Canada has never sought to dissuade Canadian investors from involvement in these areas. On the contrary, it appointed an honorary trade commissioner in Luanda in 1973, and officially promoted trade with the Portuguese colonies to the very end of the colonial wars.

This leads to our second basic criticism of Canadian policy towards southern Africa. Canada has condemned racism and oppression in South Africa but has continued to benefit from it economically and, by so benefiting, has reinforced the economic power and resilience of the regime. Canada has thus increased South Africa's capacity to oppress and has helped to sustain the self-confidence of the oppressors. We who argue in this way accept the fact that every foreign policy must have built into it a cut-off point at which principles must be sacrificed to preserve economic well-being. No state can be com-