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United States, and it is most unlikely that anything of the kind is contemplated.

But the second suggestion is within the bounds of possibility.

7. This suggestion receives some support from statements which have been made by Soviet officials (though not so far as I know by any official in a position to know the inner councils of the Soviet Government) to the effect that the Soviet Government will never let General Sikorski go back to Poland. It is, indeed, evident that a Government under General Sikorski or someone of approximately the same general outlook could never suit the Soviet Government so well as one set up under their own auspices. With their forces in occupation of Poland generally (and not merely of those parts to which they themselves lay claim) it would probably be necessary for them, in any case, to set up provisional Polish local administrations to cope with the feeding and so forth of the population until a regular Government could be formed; and it is easy to imagine how, in favourable circumstances, these local administrations might, through elections, &c., be transformed into a Soviet-controlled Government, without the Polish Government now in London having any chance to establish itself or the Governments of Great Britain and the United States being given any formal ground for complaining that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter or the Anglo-Soviet Treaty were being ignored.

8. But while the actions of the Soviet Government when once their troops are in occupation of Polish soil may assume many unexpected forms, the opinion of some of the best informed of those with whom I have discussed the question is that it is improbable that they have taken any definite or final decision about

matters which are still, after all, a long way off.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Ambassador),
LACY BAGGALLAY.

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