

duration of the above-mentioned study, even though the Senate may then be sitting, and that Rule 76(4) be suspended in relation thereto.—(*Honourable Senator Frith*).

**Hon. Royce Frith (Deputy Leader of the Opposition):** Honourable senators, we support this motion.

Motion agreed to.

#### CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ACT

BILL TO AMEND—SECOND READING—ORDER STANDS

On the Order:

Resuming the debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Macquarrie, seconded by the Honourable Senator Tremblay, for the second reading of the Bill C-69, intituled: "An Act to amend the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Act and certain other Acts in relation thereto".—(*Honourable Senator MacEachen, P.C.*)

**Hon. Royce Frith (Deputy Leader of the Opposition):** Honourable senators, Senator MacEachen will proceed on this order tomorrow or Tuesday next.

Order stands.

#### STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE—DEBATE CONTINUED

On the Order:

Resuming the debate on the inquiry of the Honourable Senator Gigantès calling the attention of the Senate to the Strategic Defense Initiative.—(*Honourable Senator Godfrey*.)

**Hon. John M. Godfrey:** Honourable senators, I am not an expert on SDI, and I do not claim to be an expert, although I have listened to many experts over the years. Honourable senators will be pleased to hear that I am not an expert on everything. Unfortunately, I was not in the chamber to hear Senator Gigantès' speech, but I did hear Senator Steuart's and I have read Senator Gigantès'. I will not repeat what Senator Gigantès has said, because, essentially, I agree with what he has said. I will comment on Senator Steuart's intervention later.

I should like to speak from a personal point of view on the question of deterrence. In 1982 I attended a meeting of the Canada-European Parliamentary Association in Copenhagen. On the agenda for that meeting was the subject of nuclear defence. I asked the chairman of the meeting the following question: As long as there is a possibility of the United States being able to retaliate against the U.S.S.R. sufficiently to destroy Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, what possible motive could the U.S.S.R. have for starting a nuclear war?

The answer given by the chairman was: "My dear man, don't you realize that the U.S.S.R. is bent on world conquest

[Senator Lorna.]

and that human life means nothing to them?" I did not think that was a very intelligent answer because the leaders of the U.S.S.R. like their dachas and their comforts in Moscow and would not want to see them destroyed any more than anyone else in similar circumstances would.

A month later I attended a parliamentary dinner for the Canadian Ambassador to NATO. When the Ambassador finished his speech I asked him the same question. I received a five or six minute answer containing all kinds of mumbo-jumbo; what they have, what we have, and so on. When he finished, I rose and told him that he obviously had not heard my question. I told him that I was not in the least interested in the balance of power, that I was asking a theoretical question. He then proceeded to answer with more mumbo-jumbo. He told me about how many missiles we had, how many missiles they had, and so on. When he finished with that answer I again told him that he obviously did not understand the question or was refusing to answer it. I then started to leave the room. I was intercepted by an official from the Department of External Affairs. He followed me down the hall and gave me more mumbo-jumbo. He told me that I did not seem to understand. I told him that I was asking a purely theoretical question.

I raised the same question when Lord Carrington was here. His answer was: "That's a very good question," but he really did not answer it. In fact, he came up to me on one occasion and told me again that I had asked a very good question.

On May 24 of last year, at a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vorotnikov, a member of the Politburo was present. I put the question the other way round and asked him: In view of the fact that I have been told that the U.S.S.R.'s submarine fleet, without any intercontinental ballistic missiles, can destroy every city in the United States with a population of over 10,000, what possible excuse would the Americans have, what reason could they possibly have, for starting a nuclear war? His answer to that was: "Well, you had better ask the Americans." I thought that was on a par with the answer I had received in Copenhagen. He proceeded to launch into a spiel of five or six minutes and gave me statistics on how many missiles they had and how many missiles we had.

The last time I asked this question was in Stuttgart at a meeting of NATO members. I was on the military committee, and we heard from a Dr. Lynn Davis, the Director of Studies, International Institute for Strategic Studies. After she made her presentation, I asked her—and I was getting a little more sophisticated—the following question: What possible motive would the U.S.S.R. have for starting a nuclear war if they know that one western nuclear submarine can destroy the 40 largest cities in the U.S.S.R.? That was something I had discovered since I had put my original question. I must say that Dr. Davis fielded many other questions but chose to ignore mine. I have not been very successful in obtaining an answer to that question.

While being briefed by a rather junior official from the Department of External Affairs for a committee I was serving