

*Supply—External Affairs*

it matters, a study which has just been published. It talks about the basic issue, the question of whether or not the truth lies in American aggression or invasion from the north. On balance it says that the truth lies between these two extreme positions but probably a good deal nearer the American standpoint. It adds that the Hanoi government has sent large contingents of troops, sometimes in trickles, sometimes in solid formation, into South Viet Nam giving the whole conflict the character of invasion.

I remember approximately a year ago listening to Arthur Goldberg in Tokyo when he met with a large battery of international news correspondents who questioned him for two hours. If ever a man held open his arms to any possibility for peace it was Mr. Goldberg on that occasion. However, we do not hear about that from members in some parts of this chamber. Surely what matters is not alone the future of Viet Nam, important as this may be, but the future of all southeast Asia. But of course the future of South Viet Nam and of North Viet Nam is vitally important on its own account.

Ho Chi Minh almost paraphrases Mao Tse Tung in some of his chapters on mobile war and protracted war. When he wrote that "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars and the war in Viet Nam is going to be a long, inconclusive war," I think Ho Chi Minh was wrong. I think that really he is now losing this war. I think that the 20,000 American dead and the gallant dead from South Viet Nam—and everyone knows it has been hard for those people to continue the struggle—are going to give peace and stability in our time, and perhaps before too long.

It would have been so easy to call it quits in Korea. Does anyone deny today that the defence of Korea was not wise from the standpoint of Asia? I believe Korea was strategically important for a wide variety of reasons.

We know there is a strong feeling in this country that if only we could get rid of this dreadful war everything would work out all right. In fact many people urge that the Americans should just plain get out. Does that make sense? I am looking at a news item appearing in the Brockville *Recorder and Times*, the issue of March 18, 1967, just a year ago, headed "Mao in Control At Gunpoint?" It was a story that came from Hong Kong and it reads:

Mainland broadcasts claimed today the Communist Chinese army has taken over farms and [Mr. Matheson.]

factories in three more southeastern provinces. If true, it means that Mao Tse-tung has established control of production at gunpoint over a vast area of southern China... the 2,500,000 man army had become the principal instrument of the communist party chairman's "great proletarian cultural revolution," a purge of so-called reactionary elements in Chinese life.

It meant, too, that the army was achieving at least some success through force where Mao's militant civilian Red Guards and revolutionary rebels had failed, through political agitation, propagandizing and appeals to win popular support for the purge.

I had a chance to talk to the first Red Guard known to have gotten out, and quite frankly I believe that Chairman Mao has failed in a great many respects.

● (5:00 p.m.)

What is our attitude in respect to this quarter of the human race? I think it must be one of friendship but at the same time it must be based on realism and facing the real facts. According to people who have studied this area for many years, one of the most significant developments is the deterioration of relations between Russia and China. Surely our attitude is not one of hostility to either of these communist powers. As Canadians we desire full co-operation with both. From a study of some of the economic reports which have come from Singapore and Hong Kong I have come to the view that perhaps one of Canada's major responsibilities in the not too distant future will be to help in respect of the starvation problem which will be manifest on the continent of China. I have in my hand a detailed agricultural study by an eminent economist who writes:

Why has China failed to keep pace in grain with increase in population? The answer is that grain production is much less profitable to the peasant than are cash crops. In the wake of the collapse of the great leap forward in 1960 there were urgent appeals by the government for the peasants, particularly those near big cities, to produce vegetables, pork, poultry, etc. The response to this was staggering. By 1966 you had reached a situation where in the land adjacent to the bigger towns (which also happens to be the richest and best agricultural land in China) all the resources, the fertilizer, the irrigation and the love, care and attention of the peasants both communally and privately, is devoted to cash crops.

There could, of course, be seven or eight crops of vegetables in a year. Grain deteriorated in volume. Actually it may now be argued that Mao has failed very seriously since 1957 in respect of what he regarded as the most important agricultural objective, the production of grain.