

*North Atlantic Treaty*

objective, that is the preservation of peace itself. I hope that when the minister is closing this debate he will take the opportunity to reply to certain inquiries which I propose to make during my participation in the discussion in order that we may have a more comprehensive picture of where we stand in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Of course it would be idle to suggest that everything has been sweet and lovely so far as the deliberations of the North Atlantic council up to the present time are concerned. The meeting in Ottawa brought out some important facts. Perhaps it may be said that that meeting democratized the institution to some extent. It certainly brought into the council of the organization some of the smaller powers which up to that time had not felt that their voices had been heard in the same way as those of some of the larger powers.

There was one thing that struck me in connection with the meeting at Ottawa, and I speak only as an outside observer who was here while the meetings were in progress. I refer to the desire of certain European nations not to have their economies affected too greatly by NATO obligations with respect to military matters in the hope that they may be able to keep up their present social security programs in order to keep the threat of communism from penetrating from within while they are preparing to halt it from without before it commits any act of aggression. There I suppose rests one of the principal problems which NATO has to deal with.

Up to the present time there have been many committees working on what is required, but I think the great problem will be to find out how far each nation is prepared to go in carrying its share of the burden which it considers necessary in order that peace shall be preserved. When the minister goes to Lisbon I hope that, so far as Canada is concerned, he will take with him some concrete plans to be meshed in with those of other members of NATO so that we shall come out of Lisbon with something that is real and not merely visionary and imaginary.

If we do not come out of Lisbon with something that is worth while in the opinion of the public of this and other countries I am afraid we may have a lessening of enthusiasm and support which normally would be given to the NATO organization.

As one who from the beginning has been a strong advocate and supporter of NATO, I think we should make sure that this country is a supporter of NATO not only in words but in carrying out its commitments to the extent to which we should go in the interests of peace.

[Mr. Graydon.]

As the minister has said, two more countries are being taken into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I could not agree more with what the minister said a few moments ago when he pointed out the necessity of removing the last vestige of uncertainty in connection with crucial and delicate areas in various parts of the world. I am satisfied that uncertainty, wavering and hesitancy are an open invitation to trouble in many of these areas. I am satisfied that if prior to the crossing of the 38th parallel in June of 1950 there had been no hesitancy and uncertainty on the part of the United Nations then those who control the red armies, whether they are North Korean, Chinese or Russian, would not have proceeded to cross the 38th parallel at all. Having that very definitely in mind, it seems to me that the risk which some people think is involved in our acceptance of the membership of Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic community is much less than they would have us think. While people say there are two tender spots so far as the Russian mind is concerned, the Dardanelles, the sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, and at the Elbe in Germany, nevertheless let us not forget that something similar was said when Norway came into the organization. People said that Norway was taking a very long chance. The Norwegians interested in the preservation of peace were perhaps taking a long chance, particularly when a country so exposed to the Soviet flank joined such an organization even for defensive purposes, as it was understood it was to be.

But strangely enough, if my information is correct, the Soviet sent about the same kind of note to the Norwegians objecting to their entry into the organization as they have sent to the Turks and the Greeks. I think that indicates that after all if the Soviets are prepared to move they are not going to move just because we have made it certain that if they do so in a certain troubled spot and attack one nation all the others in the same organization will take appropriate action to stop that aggression. Having learned some of the lessons of two world wars, I think we ought to apply them now, and I am one of those who believe strongly that we should not allow a fog of uncertainty to settle over the Aegean sea or the sea of Marmora at this time. It is a strategic point because of the fact that the Soviets today are following the policy of trying to move towards warm water ports. Such a policy characterized the regimes of the old czars of yesterday. In all the Soviet moves outside the communist movement itself where it has been a question of Russia as a nation as opposed to other parts of the globe, there has been a strange