

A movement which, in theory should have been informed with a militant, messianic vision has been reduced in Soviet hands to a protest movement with a protest ideology. The U.S.S.R. has used an increasingly conventional foreign service for critical matters and has been little indebted to the international Communist movement for such diplomatic successes as it has had. The Comintern had outlived its usefulness by twelve years when it was abolished in 1943. Its successor in 1947, the Cominform, was a hasty riposte to the Marshall Plan, and not all of the bloc countries have yet agreed to support an international journal, which even bears in its title the more modest term "socialism" rather than "communism". The Communist parties throughout the world have followed the Communist party in the Soviet Union in regularly thinning their membership; and the Soviet preference for controlling minorities rather than for proselytizing majorities suggests a preoccupation with purposes more immediate than the extension of Soviet influence. Whereas Stalin was vague about the circumstances in which he would commit the Red Army to further revolution in other countries, Khrushchev has gone so far as to seek a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and by asking the West to recognize the status quo and offering a non-aggression pact, would seem to have formally renounced any obligation to use the Soviet forces to expand communism, at least in Western Europe. If we may suspect that Stalin found the international communist movement of relatively little use, Khrushchev sometimes gives the impression that he might prefer to get rid of it altogether.

Let me turn now to the record of Soviet diplomacy. The official Soviet view of the international situation has been formulated at fifteen party congresses since 1917, and this view has implied one abiding objective for Soviet diplomacy - the security of the Soviet state. The pattern begins in 1920 when Soviet representatives began to serve specific and conventional goals; to postpone the inevitable Western attack, to break out of isolation, and to accelerate national recovery by extending diplomatic and commercial links. By 1929 the Litvinov Protocol had temporarily solved the problem of the Western border by joining the U.S.S.R. and its immediate neighbours in a non-aggression pact. In the '30s the formula was collective security against Fascism. But the diplomatic failure to contain Germany led to a pact with Hitler and to absorption of the Baltic states and much of Poland; i.e. to strategic action to organize the Western border defences which was typical of a desperate regime accustomed to total solutions to crucial problems. If Moscow had hopes of extending its power beyond Germany in the Second World War, these do not seem to have conditioned its strategic thinking. Unless we can believe that Moscow would be pleased by the prospect of a communist