

real aim of the Canadian people. We do not want to dominate anybody. We do not want to throw our weight around anywhere. But we do not want to let events take such a course that we will find ourselves a third time, as we did in 1914 and in 1939, with no real choice but to take part in a world war.

The change, I believe is not in aim but in method. Perhaps your hopes in the United States were a little stronger than ours ever were in Canada, but we all shared the hope -- that if we simply minded our own business and did not trespass on the rights of others, we might remain at peace. We now see that, if we are to have peace, the people and the governments of this continent have no choice but to take positive and sustained action to help prevent another war.

It might be said that we have already failed in that task because of what has happened in Korea. To those in that unhappy land there certainly has been no peace. But I think that our action there is designed to prevent aggression from spreading into a general world conflict.

Peace is still our aim, but we see that to have peace we must go about it differently. To the vast majority of North Americans on both sides of the border, keeping the peace is the most important business we have or we can have. It is the greatest national interest of the United States as it is the greatest national interest of Canada.

No doubt it is still true that, if a world war came in 1951, other countries in the old world would suffer more immediate destruction and devastation than this continent -- though we could certainly not expect to go untouched. But on the other hand, we on this North American continent are today the most privileged people on earth. Having the most to lose by the devastation and dislocation of a world war, we have the strongest incentive to prevent one. By taking positive steps to prevent war, we inevitably take the kind of action which might be regarded as provocative by the only possible major aggressor. This is the kind of calculated risk which every businessman and every economist understands. In any case there is no real choice. We know what did happen when we were not ready to take such risks.

In the first year or two after San Francisco, we continued to hope, against hope, that the great powers in the United Nations which had been charged with the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world would in fact co-operate to that end. But the prospect of that co-operation grew dimmer and dimmer, because one of the great powers seemed bent on different ends and many of us in Canada, like many others in the United States and in Western Europe, decided that the only hope for immediate security and the only one likely prospect of preventing another world war lay in combining and in expanding the resources -- military and economic and moral -- of those nations which genuinely wanted peace, and which had potential strength either of population or resources to contribute to an effective combination for peace.

It was this growing centre of common interest which was the genesis of the North Atlantic alliance. The military aim of that partnership is to build up a force adequate to deter an aggressor from starting any D-day in the hope that D-day, like tomorrow, will never come. The United States