the other hand, only wilful or blind ignorance could support a policy of fattening a defenceless Europe, to fall an easy victim to the first aggressor. Perhaps the most important result of adequate military defences would be a state of mind leading to economic gains. A householder who may be evicted at any time is not likely to devote energy and money to long-term repairs and improvements. The exposed economies of Western Europe may well suffer from the same handicap.

Another consideration which we on this continent should keep before us is expressed by Premier Queuille of France, when he said recently of the United States, "We think you would come to liberate us if we were invaded, but this time I am afraid nothing would be left to liberate except the corpse of Europe."

The problem involved in Article 3, so easy to state, so difficult to resolve, is related also to Article 2, which reads:

"The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

This article is one which the Canadian Government has always considered of special importance, as it emphasizes the fact that our Pact is -- or should be -- far more than a military alliance of the type which disappears as soon as the emergency which prompted its negotiation has disappeared. We must broaden the basis of this alliance so that it becomes a living, constructive social and economic force in international affairs. Article 2 gives us a foundation on which to do this.

Then there is Article 9, which sets up -- in general terms -- the machinery to carry out the objects of the association. A great deal remains to be done before this Article is implemented by the actual establishment of such machinery. Work, of course, is proceeding for this purpose, and its successful conclusion will make demands on our political vision and understanding. The machinery must be effective in coordinating and strengthening the defensive capacity of our association. It must be simple, with those who have the main responsibilities possessing the power. At the same time, the smaller members of the group cannot be bound by plans in the making of which they did not participate and which they may not have even known about. A solution may be found in the Council, which represents all the members, having the power to lay down general principles of collective action with smaller agencies with delegated powers responsible for transforming these principles into detailed plans.

The phenomenally successful World War II coalition depended to a large extent on the political unity achieved by Roosevelt and Churchill, the strategic coordination effected by the combined Chiefs of Staff, and the unity of command established in the various theatres of operations.

Article 9 provides the basis for two of these principles -- a Council which would probably be composed of Foreign Linisters