

12. The possibilities of setting up Field Offices and issues raised by the example of the Agency's Field Offices should be studied.
13. The operation and effects of the Agency's designation procedure for its inspectors should be studied, with a view to discovering how some of its problems could be avoided through revised designation procedures or through other policies on the part of the Agency. Similar difficulties could be possible for a chemical weapons verification agency.
14. The working of the Agency's dispute settlement mechanism should be examined, both in general terms and in relation specifically to disputes over the application of safeguards and the resolution of problems arising from safeguards findings.
15. The Agency provides a variety of support services for its safeguards activities, and depends on states for others. The operation of its support services should be studied. More generally, the type, level, organization and supply of support services needed for a chemical weapons verification agency should be considered, using the Agency as a guideline, bearing in mind the specific safeguards activities it would be engaged in, the dynamic nature of the sector it would monitor, and the desirability for at least some independence from state-supplied services.
16. The problems and possibilities of the Agency's research into the Remote Continuous Verification (RECOVER) system should be examined, as a means not only of monitoring safeguards instruments but also, more generally, of developing means for remote, real-time monitoring of facility operations.
17. The Agency's different classes of inspections should be examined closely, to see if a similar classification and similar procedures could be of use in the chemical weapons area.
18. Any experience with surprise and special inspections should be considered for its possible application to challenge inspections.