

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would like now to take the opportunity to make a few remarks with regard to the convention on chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran, having faced the bitter experience of the use of chemical weapons, has done its utmost to sensitize the international community in order to pave the way for an effective and comprehensive convention on the total elimination and prohibition of the development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons. The history of the use of these weapons in the past vividly testifies to the need for a comprehensive convention with clear and unambiguous provisions for its implementation. The convention which is now under negotiation has great security implications for Iran and hence we follow the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject with great care, attention and interest.

For the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the historical approach is a plausible one, but the impact of science and technology in various fields, such as chemistry, chemical engineering, mechanics and bio-technology, should also be studied and be taken into account. This convention is to be an important international instrument which has to prove its applicability for generations to come. This first real and universal experience in disarmament should be crowned with success. In this respect, the trend of progress of such weapons - which will create a potential capacity in shadow - should be carefully studied and identified, and necessary measures should be taken in response to technological and scientific development.

Therefore, our scientific, legal and technical discussions and deliberations should be based upon a scenario approach in order to prevent any possible loopholes in the future. Such an approach will enable us to foresee all contingencies and work out necessary measures in the convention.

There is no doubt that we are working for a multilateral convention in which States with different industrial and scientific capabilities are expected to join. Their security requirements also differ with respect to their regions, which dictate various degrees of security priorities. These topics were taken up this year in the Chairman's open-ended consultations on undiminished security. I have to note with some regret that these exchanges of candid views did not continue.

It is important to remind the Conference that the conditions leading to a bilateral agreement, which is based upon a balance of hidden capacity of chemical weapons production, differ drastically from those of a multilateral accord, which should be based upon a clear perception of security for all. It is therefore not advisable to hastily translate such an agreement into a multilateral accord and persuade the negotiating parties to follow the same prescription. There is no doubt that many positive and productive deductions can be drawn from the bilateral agreement, provided that other pertinent conditions be taken into account before efforts are made to generalize them. Our work should be based upon "precision" and "speed", the basic requirements for a successful conclusion of the convention.