

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

being developed by at least one State? We have heard repeated assurances from the United States delegation and a number of other States that binary weapons will be subject to absolute prohibition under the convention. These are fine words. But they are still not enough. It is essential that the problems arising in connection with binary weapons should be resolved both in the process of the consultations with technical experts and in the Committee as a whole.

The participants in the consultations, and no doubt all members of the Committee also, have obviously noted that we, the Soviet delegation, are interested, for example, at the practical level, in the problem of the prevention of the concealed manufacture, either in the guise of commercial manufacture or via a "division of labour" among States, of components of binary systems, special-purpose additives for such systems, including catalysts, and also devices and constructions specifically intended for binary systems. We have raised the question how to identify for the purposes of the convention those areas of chemistry and chemical technology where the emergence of new, as yet unknown systems of binary weapons is possible; and how to devise methods for the detection of stockpiles of binary weapons that might already exist if, that is, in defiance of the General Assembly's decision States had embarked on the production of binary weapons? We have not received answers to these questions from any delegation, including that of the United States.

With regard to the section on the scope of the prohibition, I should like to draw attention to the fact that there are no provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the Soviet draft, for a simple reason: the use of chemical weapons is unconditionally and absolutely prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stocks will deprive States, so to speak, of the material basis for violating the 1925 Protocol inasmuch as they will not even have any chemical weapons. We therefore believe that if there is a real rather than a feigned desire to strengthen the regime for the non-use of chemical weapons established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, then the fundamental thing to do is to direct all efforts towards the speediest possible conclusion of the convention we are working on. Let us suppose that, with a convention in existence, suspicions arise concerning the use of chemical weapons. This will automatically give rise to a suspicion of the violation of one or of several of the obligations entered into by States under the convention, namely, the obligations not to develop, produce, transfer or retain chemical weapons and to destroy all stocks thereof. In short, it seems to us that this question, which has been posed and blown up in a rather artificial and unjustifiable manner, becomes all the more complicated when it is proposed in the context of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to solve questions relating to other international agreements. This merely further complicates a task that is already complicated enough.

The second main section of the Soviet draft, entitled "Declarations and confidence-building measures", reflects the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to ensuring implementation of the convention on the basis of international co-operation. I do not intend now to dwell on all the declarations and confidence-building measures we have proposed; I should simply like to stress that they are all closely linked with the verification measures and should be viewed as forming a