

25. *The Arms Control Reporter* 1989, p. 407.B.215.
26. *Trust and Verify: The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre*, December/January 1990 (London, England: Vertic, 1990), p. 1.
27. *The Arms Control Reporter* 1989, p. 407.B.219.
28. Ibid.
29. *Chapter III: Measures of Information Exchange, Stabilization, Verification, and Non-circumvention*, Conference paper, Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 21 September 1989, pp. 1-14.
30. A distinction should be drawn between "verification measures" and "measures facilitating verification." Data exchanges assist the verification process. Compliance with weaponry ceilings cannot be confirmed in the absence of a verifiable data base, including such information as unit numbers and types, weaponry stocks, etc. Strictly speaking, though, this is not a "verification" measure; it differs fundamentally from measures specifying the means by which treaty-related activities are physically observed, e.g., on-site inspections or surveillance overflights. In the same vein, overhead surveillance using National Technical Means, i.e., earth-orbiting satellite systems, should be classified as a verification measure, while non-interference with NTM is more properly a verification-facilitating measure (it sets the environment in which NTM can operate with maximum effectiveness). To attempt a definition, "verification measures" are the means or modalities by which treaty-regulated activities are physically observed and monitored; while "facilitating measures" are actions, norms and procedures enhancing the operational effectiveness of monitoring systems.
31. *The Arms Control Reporter* 1989, p. 407.D.43.