

presumed activities in adversary defence industries. It is difficult to imagine, however, officials from adversary states such as the United States and the USSR discussing such intrinsically sensitive material. This scheme also assumes a far greater degree of rational control over "defence industry" than is in fact possible. It appears to be the case that senior political decision makers often do not know about and, hence, cannot control the intricacies of their own defence establishment's plans and programmes. If such a proposal were to be put into practice, it would probably operate in much the same way as would other Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence would be built to the extent that independent verification supported the claims made by various participants. Despite some natural skepticism about its practicality and usefulness, this proposal is not without some merit. A regular exchange of military research and development information, even on a rather general level, could be helpful and could be conducted under the aegis of an institution like the SALT-inspired Standing Consultative Commission.

5. **Arms Control Impact Statements.** This type of proposal is similar to the preceding one. Here, however, the idea is to consciously consider the full range of consequences flowing from particular weapon-system development and acquisition decisions. The need to provide clear rationales for and assessments of the longer-term impact of weapon systems in development would sensitize decision makers to the potentially destabilizing consequences of certain types of weapons – conventional, nuclear or dual purpose – before they are deployed or thoroughly tested. Whether or not the major powers would agree to a regime requiring such "impact statements" is hard to estimate, but such a proposal would certainly expose the careless or weak reasoning behind many decisions to public scrutiny.
6. **Standing Consultative Commission.** Several proposals dealing with European security issues have suggested that a body similar to the SALT-mandated Standing Consultative Commission be instituted in order to deal with various arms control-related procedural and compliance ques-

tions on a continuing basis. CSCE and MBFR proposals have included such a suggestion. These SCC-type bodies have also been suggested for use in resolving additional strategic nuclear problem areas, particularly the demilitarization of space. Their primary virtue resides in their private and generally depoliticized, technical character. As an institutional means of smoothing out compliance problems and questions, these bodies have much to recommend them in various existing and potential arms control regimes.

7. **Military exchange and liaison programmes.** This sort of proposal does not quite belong in this category. However, because the basic purpose of these types of exchanges is educational, they can be regarded as "information measures" without stretching the category too much. Here, the idea is quite simple and straightforward. Officers (and, perhaps, NCOs) spend time functioning with or observing adversary military forces in order to gain a more human-dimensioned understanding of the "enemy". Familiarity with soldiers from other military forces and their customary practices gained in this manner presumably decreases the tendency to view "them" as the faceless enemy and also helps to reduce some of the mystery associated with their actions. Like some other information measures, this proposal seeks to counter ethnocentrism. It has yet to be determined whether these exchange programmes, at whatever level and in whatever form, might not lead to deliberate deceit on the one hand (Let's carefully choreograph activities so we won't look bad with visiting Russians around!) or contempt on the other (a closer look may reveal ineptitude and weakness where strength and skill was previously assumed). In addition, the discovery of unexpected weaknesses could actually *encourage* instability. This highlights one of the intrinsic difficulties with many CBM proposals. *To the extent that they reduce uncertainty about military capabilities and intentions, CBMs can actually decrease stability and increase the chances of war. Uncertainty can serve a constructive pur-*

