

pledge. I like to feel that I keep right because I want to, and not because I have taken a pledge and have to. A person must be pretty weak who can't leave liquor alone without a pledge." You've heard them say it, and perhaps you have thought that they might as well have added: "I'm afraid folks will think I'm weak if I take a pledge." I know that is the feeling because I've had it. I used to talk like that myself. I never did admit that I needed to take a pledge, but feeling sure that I should never want to indulge in strong drink, there came a time when I failed to see any reason why I shouldn't promise not to do a thing I didn't want to do. Since then I've signed a dozen pledges and I am willing to sign dozens more if it will do any one any good. It is very strange that the whole world didn't change its notion when I did, but it didn't, and I quite frequently meet young people afflicted with the old superstition, and I always look round for a chair or a couch when they begin to talk about it. With a weary sigh of resignation I greet the beginning of the tiresome moral yarn. You know it. It has the awful example and the innocent youth; the awful example says how sorry he is he can't reform, and the godly youth swears he will never touch a drop. My objection to stories of this class is that they are not true enough to appeal to real live boys. Story telling is an art. The average moral yarn is not a work of art, and fails to accomplish its end. The story that stirs a child and teaches him has its moral so skillfully wrought into its fibre that he can neither see it nor miss it. Let the awful example tell his tale. If it doesn't work upon the real boy there is no use in making up a godly little chap who will be worked upon, and putting him into the story. His good resolutions will never help the live fellow, and if the awful example can't do it, the untruthfulness of the story is recognized, and the sublime becomes ridiculous.

Now I come to another class of tire-

some things, and there are so many that I can only take a few at random. They are the moss-covered arguments used against those who believe that the only way to deal with a beast that ought not to live is to kill it.

The first one is the saying that, "you can't make men moral by law." I will plead like the man who was sued for the value of an iron pot he had borrowed and returned broken. In his defence, you remember, he claimed: first, that he had never borrowed the pot; second, that he had returned it in good condition, and, (third), that it was cracked when he got it. Now, as to making men moral by law. In the first place nobody said you could; and in the second place everybody knows you can. Of course this is flung at those who would invoke the power of Government to close the saloons by shutting down the breweries and distilleries. But the aim of these people is not to make men moral by law; it is simply to make it impossible, or at least difficult for them to continue in a course that leads inevitably to immorality.

But everybody now-a-days knows that you can make men moral by law. We are beginning to act upon the theory that punishments for crime should be deterrent and reformatory. When you urge laws against lotteries, you do not expect the laws to convince gamblers of the unrighteousness of their ways; but you do expect a very wholesome moral effect upon the community. The presence of evil is demoralizing; the more of it we can shut off by law or in any other way, the more moral we become.

And this brings us to another tiresome thing: "If you make laws against a thing, that thing everybody immediately wants." If I tell a boy not upon any account to look at a certain pernicious periodical, he will compass heaven and earth and any other place necessary to get a glimpse of the wicked thing. But if I stop the publication of the paper, how then? If he never has