

necessary, on regulation and control of foreign influences. Various public bodies have been established, such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in the 1930s, in radio and later in television, the National Film Board in 1939 and the Canada Council in 1957. These policies have had a favourable impact, though difficult problems continue to exist in a number of important areas. There have been encouraging signs, in both French-speaking and English-speaking parts of Canada, of cultural vitality and creativeness and of renewed interest in Canadian tradition and distinct values. Over all, the interactions and links between the Canadian and U.S. societies in the cultural field have been steadily increasing, even as a mood of resistance to U.S. dominance was emerging as a significant political factor.

In terms of common institutions, Canada-U.S. ties do not appear to have increased significantly, at least not in the last decade. An elaborate pattern of joint Canada-U.S. bodies has been developed over the years. These play an important role in evaluating and advising on joint problems and in pointing the way to solutions. But there is little or no joint decision-making. By and large, relations between the two countries are dealt with in the normal way, through intergovernmental consultations, negotiations and bargaining.

On balance, it is apparent that it is in the economic and cultural fields that the North-South pull has been especially strong. This is because advances in communications and modes of production and economic integration favour large units and markets and add to the pull of geography. On the other hand, in the defence and political fields, continental linkages have not significantly increased in recent years. The strongest continental pulls appear to derive from the ubiquitous presence of U.S.-owned subsidiaries of large multinational corporations, and from the wealth of informal, non-governmental ties between private groups, associations and individuals. Paradoxically, as these ties have expanded, the capacity of Canada to develop economically and culturally with less reliance on the United States and the outside world in general has also increased.

II. The Changing Context

New foreign policy perspectives

Over the past three years both Canada and the United States have been review-

ing their foreign policies. Many of the reasons given for doing so were identical on both sides. We were at the end of an era. The postwar order of international relations was drawing to an end. The conditions that had determined the assumptions and practice of our respective foreign policies were ending with it. The ending of the postwar era had not been a matter of sudden upheaval but of cumulative change over two decades that, in the aggregate, had transformed the international environment. The task now, we both concluded, was to shape a new foreign policy to meet the requirements of a new era.

In the new scheme of things both Canada and the United States saw a relatively diminished role for themselves. In our case, we argued that our role had been enhanced at a time when Canada had enjoyed a preferred position and a wide range of opportunities as one of the few developed countries to have emerged unscathed, and indeed strengthened, from the Second World War. The Canadian role was bound to be affected by the recovery of our friends and former enemies and by other changes in the configuration of world power.

The United States drew substantially similar conclusions from its review. Subject, of course, to the very different scope of its role and responsibilities in the world. It also had to take account of the strain that 25 years of global commitment, aggravated by the Vietnam war, had left on its domestic consensus. It cited the growth among Americans of a conviction that the time had come for others to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership and its corollary that the assured continuity of United States involvement required a responsible but diminished American role. It is the sense of the Nixon Doctrine that it will enable the United States to remain committed in ways that it can sustain.

These perceptions on both sides have their counterpart in the role that national objectives and national interests are henceforth to play in the conduct of foreign policy. In the case of the United States, the greater weight to be given to the shorter-term national interest is a function of the diminished role it sees for itself and of the enhanced potential of America's partners. It looks to a sound foreign policy to support its national interests. It does not rule out new commitments, provided they are clearly related to U.S. interests. It is U.S. interests that in future will shape U.S. commitments, rather than, as they feel