

then was there not a more powerful fleet ordered, in time, to block up, or to intercept *Macnamara's* convoy? Could the sovereign of the seas spare no greater force than *eleven* ships of the line, and one sloop, to defeat the embarkation for *America*? Did the ministry exert the *utmost* of their power in defence of our colonies, and to maintain the dominion of the seas, when they, apprised of the force under sailing orders at *Brest*, confined their own strength to a squadron under Mr. *Boscawen*, of little more than half the force; totally neglected a necessary supply of land men; and paid no manner of regard to the equipment of *ten ships of the line* at *Toulon*, of which they had positive advice on the 14th of *April*: nor to the intelligence from consul *Banks*, on the 12th of *March*; which he wrote under a confirmed opinion, that *there*

On *Feb. 10th*, He mentions great warlike preparations daily making; and a surprizing quantity of powder brought in a few days to *Calais*, in thirty flat bottomed vessels, *by the way of their canals*, and more expected.

*Feb. 28th*, He writes: The only intelligence this day learned from *Calais* is, that the troops, which were ordered from the interior parts towards the sea coast, have received counter-orders: and that every thing at that time seemed to be very quiet at *Calais*.

*March 10th*.—600 bomb-shells are brought into *Calais*, and laid on the key: but their destination is a profound secret. At the same place are also arrived 60 cannoneers; and more troops are expected. But notwithstanding this mighty warlike preparation, I cannot learn they are taking any steps to increase their shipping at that place, which at present is very inconsiderable. See *Admiralty office*.

would