

was tolerated by those of their own. Hence the reason for that so often misquoted remark, that "to press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands in the way of its establishment; to force the way to the liberation of Africa, by trampling on the independence of other states in Europe; in short to procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as to public justice. Obtain the concurrence of other nations if you can, by application, by remonstrance, by example, by every other peaceable instrument which man can employ to obtain the consent of man. But a nation is not justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her, merely because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose, nor in setting out upon a moral crusade of converting other nations by acts of unlawful force."

Nowhere throughout the whole of this case does Lord Stowell refer to any change of his opinion, as expressed in the cases of the "*Amedie*" and "*Fortuna*," but six years previously. Had the circumstances given rise to any such change, he would have avowed it, and given his reasons for it.

The fact is, there was no change in his opinion. Only the circumstances of the case of "*Le Louis*," not the principles upon which it was decided, were different from those of the "*Amedie*" and "*Fortuna*."

In the case of the "*Amedie*," (1 Acton's Admiralty Reports, p. 240) Sir William Grant decided, that "Transportation of slaves from the coast of Africa to Matanzas, in the island of Cuba, a colony of the enemy, was illegal, and affects the property of the ship and her cargo of slaves. The decree of the court below affirmed, condemning the cargo of slaves as prize, (afterwards set at liberty,) and the ship as lawful prize to the captor. The trade considered to be prohibited by the American law, which, having been officially notified to the court, the neutral was excluded from the