

more than eight Dreadnoughts a year. It was supposed that it would be impossible for Germany to furnish the armour and guns for more than four Dreadnoughts. Krupps have increased their resources by more than double, and they are now able to furnish armour and guns for eight Dreadnoughts. Therefore when my hon. friends talk about sending over this money for Dreadnoughts, let me tell them that the naval policy of 1909, which means the furnishing of eight Dreadnoughts is the limit of the yards of England and of the power to equip and furnish armour for those vessels. Therefore, Britain would only be able to keep our money. Let us see what has been stated by the admiralty in this matter. At page 23 they state:

It was represented on the part of the admiralty that it would be difficult to make any suggestions, or to formulate any plans, without knowing approximately the sum of money which Canada would spend. The Canadian representatives then suggested that two plans might be presented: one incurring an annual expenditure of £400,000, and the other an expenditure of £600,000, omitting in both cases the cost of the present fishery service and hydrographic surveys, but including the maintenance of Halifax and Esquimaux dockyards, and the wireless telegraph service, estimated at some £50,000 a year.

Then, they say:

Taking, first, the plan for the expenditure of £600,000, after discussion the admiralty suggested that the Canadian government might provide a force of cruisers and destroyers comprising four cruisers of improved 'Bristol' class, one cruiser of 'Boadicea' class, and six destroyers of improved River class. As regards submarines, it would be advisable to defer their construction because they required highly-trained and specialized complement.

There we have the advice of the admiralty as regard the cruiser class. Is there any hon. member within the sound of my voice, or is there any man knowing the position who would favour the advice attributed to the admiralty that a fleet unit if furnished by Canada should be stationed in the Pacific?

Mr. SAMUEL SHARPE. Did the admiralty suggest that?

Mr. HUGH H. McLEAN. They wanted suggestions, and when the matter was discussed, they say: Give us the fast cruisers, the scout type, give us destroyers; place so many on the Pacific and so many on the Atlantic because we recognize that with your double sea-board that will be better than to have the unit type. I have said, and I say it again, that personally—though I may be extravagant in this matter—I would be in favour of having a full unit on the Atlantic and, when we can af-

Mr. H. H. McLEAN.

ford it and can get it, an Indomitable also on the Pacific. That is a matter which, I say, will come; it is sure to come by the time we have men to put on the Indomitable. Do you think that Canada is going to build an Indomitable and have it manned by Englishmen who are hired to do our fighting? Not a bit of it. We will have a training ship and put our men aboard and have them trained. In three or four years they will be thoroughly qualified to furnish the crew of a first-class fighting ship. Then we shall have a Canadian ship, manned by Canadian seamen and manned, in case of a fight, by Canadians. That is the policy I would like to see adopted, and that is the policy I hope will be adopted and carried out. Let me call the attention of the House to a letter written to the 'Times' by Mr. Macaulay, who is an authority of naval matters. He puts very plausibly the reasons why a fleet unit on the Pacific would not be advisable. He says:

A cruising range of 14,000 miles would evidently entail an enormous expense, and very 'intermittent training' especially as regards the terminal units. . . . The method you advocate would again be better applied if the Canadian naval force were in the Atlantic, not on the Pacific.

He says also:

The nearest British port of any naval value to the west coast of Canada is 5,000, 6,000 miles away. This distance is only traversible by the largest war vessels (cruiser or battleship) at low speed. . . . The connection of the Canadian fleet with the rest of our naval forces, would be entirely dependent in war on the good-will of the only powers that, who for very many years at least, can possibly threaten her Pacific coast. In a war with the United States, a Canadian fleet, placed as you suggest, would be at once isolated. In a war with an east-Asian power, the naval defence of the west coast of North America can best be carried out by a fleet operating from Singapore and Hong Kong.

If the opinions of this gentleman, for the reasons given, commend themselves to the judgment of hon. members present, they can take them; certainly, they commend themselves to me.

Now, I wish to refer to one of the leading admiralty authorities of England as regards this question of cruisers. His article was published in the 'Fortnightly Review' for May, 1908. He says:

I advocate India and the colonies owning their own scouts, destroyers and submarines, as it would be out of the question for these types of small craft to be sent out when once war had been declared, no matter how pressing might be the need for them.

Other advantages might be enumerated as follows:—