

or other nuclear-explosive devices, and prohibiting the diversion for nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices of any fissionable material produced in connection with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such a measure would have the advantage of focusing in the same instrument on both the "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, before negotiations could proceed very far in the multilateral phase, it would be desirable for the two major nuclear powers, and any other nuclear-weapons states willing to participate, to explore the "cut-off" aspects, including the verification aspects applying particularly to nuclear-weapons states. Verification backed up by full-scope safeguards would ensure that all parties to such an eventual treaty would be bound essentially to the safeguards accepted by the non-nuclear-weapons states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Canada, therefore, believes that it would be appropriate, especially in view of the renewed interest shown in this subject, that this question be given early consideration in the Committee on Disarmament.

**Studies**

My remarks so far have been directed mostly to actual or potential negotiations about agreements on nuclear-arms control. I have, in the context of the CTB and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, already recalled the "strategy of suffocation" which my Prime Minister outlined before the special session on disarmament. Two other elements of that strategy, as he noted them, would be agreements to stop flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, and to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on all new strategic nuclear-weapons systems, subject to the proper verification procedures. All four of these elements remain important and should not be put aside. Even if at the present moment concrete steps towards implementation of the whole strategy may be premature, nevertheless they can and should be studied, either individually or as a part of a concerted approach. The special session has already commissioned a somewhat similar study on disarmament and international security. We are also looking forward to the recommendations of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board concerning a United Nations Studies Program. We should expect that a part of this program would include the constructive proposal by Sweden for a study of nuclear-weapons systems. Such a study would provide a further opportunity to examine the kind of approach proposed by Canada that I have just recalled.

**Reduction of  
military  
spending**

Clearly, balanced reductions of military expenditures in a bilateral, regional or even world-wide context would also have considerable benefits. As I mentioned earlier, in my intervention on Item 125 on October 27, the development of a standardized system of reporting could open the way to the possibility of creating measures for the reduction of military expenditures. We ought to consider the possibility of multi-lateral discussions on how and in what fields of military spending these reductions could be implemented. Necessary conditions for progress would be greater willingness to make information available and the need for adequate verification. I must here express disappointment that support for a pilot study of a standardized reporting system has been limited so far to a very small number of countries. Without the participation of countries from different geopolitical groups, including all nuclear-weapons states, any such test will be of limited value.