was attributable to generosity and optimism. He may have underestimated, in the immediate postwar period, the resilience of national states and their reluctance to divest themselves of some of the attributes of sovereignty to strengthen the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. But I am glad it was in that direction rather than in the opposite one that he erred, for the world would be unquestionably more secure and more prosperous today if his optimism had been justified.

Circumstances change. Succeeding Canadian Governments have found it necessary to redeploy the country's diplomatic resources and to place a new emphasis on the development of bilateral relations. But a careful reading of Lester B. Pearson's policy statements in the 1940s and 1950s will show that most of the bilateral initiatives launched in recent years by the Canadian Government are there, in germinal state: the gradual readjustment of our relationship with the United States in his controversial 1951 statement on Canada/ United States relations (it seems that no Secretary of State for External Affairs can deal with this subject without being controversial); or in our attempts to strengthen Canada's links with Europe; in his warm endorsement of the movement toward European unity in 1956; or in our rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Asian powers, such as Japan and China. All these recent bilateral initiatives, in my view, will be the more beneficial to Canada because they have been undertaken within the multilateral diplomatic framework built by Lester B. Pearson.

I have chosen to emphasize today the elements of continuity between the foreign policy of the late Mike Pearson and that of the present Government because I am convinced, like the present Secretary of State for External Affairs, that in this post-Pearson era, characterized by great changes in the international environment, Canadian diplomacy must continue to be based on Pearsonian principles. I can propose no better motto to this Department than Lester B. Pearson's challenge to the international community at the San Francisco Conference:

"The struggle for victory over war is even harder than the struggle for victory in war. It will be a slow, tough process. There must be superb organization. There must be brilliant improvisation. At times caution; at other times, a willingness to run great risks for great objectives. At all times, a refusal to permit temporary reverses to shake our belief in ultimate victory. Above all, there must be no false optimism about the possibility of an early victory. There is no easy and upholstered way from the foxhole to the millenium."

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