

THE CRISIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued from P. 2)

the proper functioning of the enforcement system laid down in Chapter VII.

As matters turned out, the great powers were unable to agree on procedures for raising the security forces contemplated by the Charter and member states were compelled to turn to regional means of organizing their security, as in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance. But the United Nations was still capable, with the consent and at the invitation of its member states, to interpose its presence in situations of conflict or potential conflict – to hold the ring, as it were, until longer-term solutions could be worked out at the political level. And that, in a sense, has been the essence of United Nations peace keeping, from the appointment of a United Nations Military Observer Group to supervise the truce in Kashmir in 1947 to the latest United Nations operation on the island of Cyprus.

What is at issue in the present constitutional crisis are the respective authorities of the Security Council and the General Assembly in relation to peace keeping. The Soviet Union, and the countries of the Soviet bloc, hold that the Security Council is the only organ competent to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security, that it alone has the authority to initiate, direct and make provision for the financing of peace-keeping operations, and that any other procedures are illegal and invalid.

RESIDUAL RIGHT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I think it is fair to say that the primacy of the Security Council in the matter of maintaining international peace and security is acknowledged by the generality of the membership of the United Nations. With the adoption, however, of the important "Uniting for Peace" resolution in 1950, the General Assembly asserted certain residual rights and responsibilities in these matters for which provision is made in the Charter. These rights and responsibilities were invoked by the General Assembly for the first time when it authorized the despatch of the United Nations Emergency Force in response to the Suez crisis. They have been invoked on two subsequent occasions and there is a general feeling that they must be preserved to deal with situations where the Security Council is unable to act.

It is also generally acknowledged, I think, that there may have to be special scales and procedures for the financing of peace-keeping operations. What is at issue is the extent to which any special arrangements can be reconciled with the need to give the United Nations an assured capacity of keeping the peace.

MOST SERIOUS CRISIS

I have endeavoured to describe the elements of the crisis which is at present facing the United Nations. It is not, of course, the first such crisis to have preoccupied us but it may well be the most serious. For its outcome may determine the shape of the future destiny of the United Nations. Is the United Nations to endure – as the Secretary-General put it – "as a dynamic and effective instrument of inter-

national action" or is it to survive – in the words of *The Economist* – "merely as a spectacular talkathon, pickled and powerless"? That is the real issue we are facing today.

I would not wish to conclude these observations without saying something about the Canadian position. Canada has a vital stake in peace keeping. We have participated in every major peace-keeping operation undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations since 1948. We have set aside standby forces within our military establishment to be at the disposal of the United Nations in situations of emergency. We look upon the evolution of the idea of peace keeping as reflecting the will and determination of the world community to work towards a peaceful and securely-ordered world. Much as we might wish it were otherwise, we do not think that the need for a United Nations capacity to keep the peace is likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.

The present crisis did not break upon us suddenly. It has been building up for some time and we have played an active part, over the past year or two, in the working group that was set up by the General Assembly to look into possible solutions. It was our hope that, if reasonable arrangements could be devised for future peace-keeping operations, there would be no difficulty in liquidating the past. But that assumption has turned out to be unrealistic, and it is now clear that all aspects of the peace-keeping problems – present, past and future – will need to be brought within the compass of negotiation. In the process of negotiation it is accepted, I think, that the permanent members of the Security Council will have a special responsibility for staking out the area within which an accommodation may be possible. This does not diminish, however, the stake which each and every member of the United Nations has in the outcome of the present crisis.

CANADIAN AIMS

As far as Canada is concerned, our objectives in the impending negotiations are simple and clear-cut. They are:

first, to restore the United Nations to solvency and to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of the present crisis;

second, to preserve the capacity of the United Nations to play its rightful part in the maintenance of international peace and security;

third, to accomplish these objectives on the basis of the broadest possible consensus, which alone will ensure that the solutions devised with regard to peace keeping are effective and durable and that the United Nations is once more enabled to press forward with other urgent business.

The French writer François de Callières once wrote that "the secret of negotiation is to harmonize the real interests of the parties concerned." For my own part, I believe that a strong and viable United Nations is and will continue to be in the real interest of all the parties to the negotiations which are about to commence. If I am right in that belief, then surely the Secretary-General is justified in expressing the conviction that, given the will to reach them, it should not prove "beyond the capacity of reasonable men to reach reasonable accommodations".