

## Conclusions

The evidence presented in this paper has addressed two issues. The first is the question of counter-force capabilities. The second is the merits of the respective reduction proposals at Geneva, having regard to both the counter-force question and general negotiability.

In regard to counter-force capabilities, it is evident from the tables and calculations that both sides have counter-force capabilities, but, as presently constituted, in mathematical terms these forces give neither side a high-confidence capability to eliminate the fixed silo ICBMs of the other side. Although the Soviet land-based "heavy" ICBMs constitute a formidable force, therefore, this does not translate into a counter-force superiority which would give the Soviet Union a political advantage in a crisis situation, or, indeed, permit them to "win" a counter-force nuclear exchange. (It must be remembered, however, that this paper has not considered attacks against command structures, which some experienced observers believe to be the most critical and vulnerable targets).

On the other hand, still in counter-force terms, the Soviet commitment to land-based missiles looms as an increasing disadvantage as the United States moves to deploy the counter-force capable Trident D-5. For this reason alone, the Soviet move to mobility is understandable and, indeed, inherently stabilizing as long as the verification issues can be resolved. The same logic applies to the Midgetman, which, of course, was precisely the case made for the development of the Midgetman by the Scowcroft Commission and others.

Finally, calculating counter-force capabilities against mobile missiles suggests that mobile missiles enjoy inherent advantages in terms of "cost to attack". The implication is that with existing ceilings, or with the presently contemplated lower ballistic missile ceilings, mobile missiles offer little incentive to an all-out counter-force strategy, and