

In 1986, two tests occurred. On 22 January, there was a free flight test which included a practice interception by two Canadian CF-18 fighters. The missile crashed in a wooded area, near the end of its flight; on 25 February, there was another free flight test in which the engine failed to ignite and the missile fell into the Beaufort Sea.

Two tests were carried out in 1987. A free flight test took place on 24 February in which US F-4 and F-16 fighters joined CF-18 fighters in trying to intercept the missile. A second, similar test was carried out on 1 March.

At the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks the United States and the Soviet Union have tentatively agreed to count ALCMs as part of a ceiling of 6,000 on nuclear warheads. The question of limitations on strategic arms remains linked to that of strategic defences and there has therefore been no final agreement.

### Current Canadian Position

A Department of National Defence publication of January 1985 stated that the ALCM is an important retaliatory element of the US strategic triad which provides the ultimate deterrent for NATO. Canada's willingness to test the cruise missile is rooted in its obligation to NATO and the strengthening of deterrence. This continues to be the Government's position. During testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Secretary of State Joe Clark reiterated this position. He said:

...[ending cruise missile tests] are steps Canada could take. They would be taken with some very real consequences. One of the consequences would be that we would be putting aside obligations we have assumed as part of the Alliance. I have made it clear that I do not intend to do that with regard to cruise testing, because I think if we intend to exercise some influence over both our own destiny and the policy of the Alliance of which we