

5. Modalities of verification are to be worked out, taking into account the monitoring provisions for key precursor chemicals, based on the level of risk posed to the Convention by the particular facility and particular chemical. 8/

(B)

6. Threshold quantity defining commercial production. 9/

(i) Should threshold be defined on a national basis or per facility? Should it be in terms of capacity or actual production?

(ii) The threshold should reflect risk of a chemical to the Convention. What is a military significant quantity?

7. Criteria for determining frequency and intensity of inspection necessary for a specific facility. Should particular features needed for CW production be specified? 10/

8. STLCs which pose a risk of diversion.

(i) Criteria for determining risk of diversion.

(ii) Possible inclusion of "near STLCs" which could have application as chemical weapons.

(iii) Possible exclusion of some STLCs or classes of STLC with no application as chemical weapons.

(iv) Should STLCs which pose a high risk be listed?

9. Régimes for facilities for processing such STLC.

---

8/ The view was expressed that different measures might need to be applied to individual facilities and chemicals.

9/ There was general agreement that it would be desirable to have a common initial reporting threshold for all chemicals. The view was expressed that as production levels increase, the stringency of verification measures should increase commensurately.

10/ The view was expressed that only a moderate level of detail was required. Reference was also made, in this connection, to the annex to document CD/698 (CD/CW/WP.140), submitted by Australia. The text of that annex is attached.