

temptation is strong. But, apart from anything else, I shrewdly suspect that the record of Canada's progress since the war is almost as well known in Seattle as it is in Vancouver.

At the same time this great physical development does have an important bearing on what I do propose to talk to you about, namely, certain features of Canadian foreign policy over the past ten years. In any event, Mr. Chairman, this is a subject more fitting perhaps to an Institute of International Affairs. And in this city of Seattle, which looks west to the Orient across the broad Pacific, I thought you might wish me to dwell especially on those phases of our external affairs which relate to Asia.

From the Second World War Canada emerged for the first time as a national entity of some considerable importance in world affairs. This was the result in part of the substantial contribution which Canadians had made to the Allied victory, even more, perhaps, to the greatly increased industrial and financial strength which made Canada, in peace or war, an ally of some consequence. The dark days of 1940 and the long pull before German and Japanese aggression were defeated convinced the great majority of Canadians that the only solid hope for a peaceful world lay in the collective strength of like-minded countries. Hitherto concerned for the most part in their external relations with the Commonwealth and the United States, Canadians, when the war was over, embraced enthusiastically the idea of the United Nations. And when, by 1948, it became evident that the attitude of the Soviet Union was obstructing the United Nations - whatever its other possibilities - from achieving world security by collective action, the Canadian Government and people were quick to join in the North Atlantic Alliance as a means of deterring aggression in the vital area of Western Europe. Canadian fighter squadrons and Canadian Army units in France and Germany, Canadian vessels in the North Atlantic forces of NATO, millions of dollars worth of Canadian equipment for our European allies, - these are the best evidence of the virtual unanimity of our people in their support of collective action for peace. The attitude of detachment from world affairs which characterized Canadian opinion between the great wars has been replaced by a realistic internationalism which transcends party lines. For practical purposes, foreign policy in Canada is not an issue in partisan politics. Parties may differ in their emphasis and in the relative importance they attach to various aspects of our external relations. But in the essentials Canadian political parties - and the Canadian people - are united.

It was natural for Canadians to respond warmly to the idea of an Atlantic community and to the challenge of NATO. For Canada is a North American country with a strong sense of Europe. Our willingness to assume substantial national responsibilities in an Atlantic coalition headed by our traditional allies - the United States, Britain and France - this in a sense was implicit in our history. By contrast, Canadian involvement in Asia and the development of a Canadian Far Eastern policy are relatively new. Indeed, our national concern with Asian affairs really dates from the outbreak of the last great war. Our Foreign Minister, Mr. L.B. Pearson, emphasized this when he wrote in 1951:

"In our Far Eastern relations we have not so much been opening a new chapter as opening a whole new volume; for, until only recently, Asia to most Canadians was a closed book."